The number 6 has an aura around it. We have 5 senses, but we always speak of a mystic 6th sense. There are 5 major continents in the world, but we speak of Australia as a mystic 6th continent. For Egyptian, during the Cholera epidemic that raged during World War 1 and came back in the 1940s, British and Egyptian authorities used to quarantine patients for 6 days. It is on the fateful 6th day that either one is proven healthy and released or proven infected and left to die. Youssef Chahine captured that sad time in Egypt's history in his movie "The 6th Day." For some reason, the 6th can be a turning point. The 6th Arab-Israeli War for sure fits the bill. The question is who out of the 6th war will be proven healthy and who will be left to die? Of course some aura can be found around many numbers but I couldn't resist using this analogy. Once you read through you will know why.
The year is 1947 and Saddika (Egyptian born singer Dalida) lives with her paralytic husband and her grandson, Hassan, while a cholera epidemic ravages Cairo. When cholera strikes Hassan, Saddika enlists the help of Okka, a Gene Kelly fanatic who has been courting her, to take Hassan to Alexandria. There they await the sixth day, the fateful day when the cholera victim either recovers or dies.
Flashback
What is behind the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel? What is happening behind the scenes? What led the Israelis to attack Lebanon? And what led Hezbollah to kidnap two Israeli soldiers? Why Egypt and Saudi Arabia appeared to side with the Israelis initially? Did the US know of the Israeli intentions beforehand?
This is a “story” that cannot be told without using the flashback technique. Flashback is defined as any scene or episode which takes the narrative back in time from the point the story has reached, to recount events that happened before and give the back-story. Moviegoers know that flashback is at times difficult to understand and can be confusing. This is however in my opinion the best way to understand the landscape of the Middle East now and how the crisis started and how it ended.
Every time I write about the Middle East, the novel “The Bridge of San Luis Rey” comes to mind. The Bridge of San Luis Rey is a 1927 novel by American author Thornton Wilder. It tells the story of several unrelated people who happen to be on a bridge in Peru when it collapses, killing all of them. Philosophically, the book explores the problem of evil, or the question of why unfortunate events occur to people who seem "innocent" or "undeserving". It won the Pulitzer Prize in 1928, and in 1998 it was selected by the editorial board of the American Modern Library as one of the 100 best novels of the 20th century.
The reason this specific novel comes to my mind now is twofold: First, this novel is the poster child for using flashback in a narrative. Second, the central plot of the novel has a group of seemingly unrelated people whose pathways intersect at the disaster point – which by itself cannot be understood in isolation from tracing their pathways and how they were marching to their fate.
For the Arab readers, a famous (or infamous depending on your point of view) usage of flashback is Director Youssef Chahine's sequel “Egyptian Story” or “Hadouta Masrieyah” in which the main character (who is Chahine himself as is typical in his movies) is undergoing an open-heart surgery and sees his life in flashback, witnessing a metaphoric trial of where he stands with friends and family.
For the Arab readers, a famous (or infamous depending on your point of view) usage of flashback is Director Youssef Chahine's sequel “Egyptian Story” or “Hadouta Masrieyah” in which the main character (who is Chahine himself as is typical in his movies) is undergoing an open-heart surgery and sees his life in flashback, witnessing a metaphoric trial of where he stands with friends and family.
Chahine's "Hadouta Masriyeah". An Arabic poster child for using flashback.
Now, I’m neither Chahine nor Wilder but let us try to use the technique to understand motivations and actions of the main characters on Middle Eastern scene. Surprisingly, we will shortly see that a lot of what is going on has to do with the art of acting than the science of politics.
The Thunder Strikes
The point of calamity starts when: Hamas (a terrorist organization for some and a resistance movement for others) kidnaps one Israeli soldier while he was on active duty in Gaza. The soldier was participating in an offense deep inside Gaza when fighting raged and the soldier was kidnapped.
This is the first time for Hamas to kidnap an Israeli soldier after it came to power. Although Hamas kidnapped another soldier before, this time both the idea and technique utilized are similar in nature to those perfected by Hezbollah during their fight against Israel in Southern Lebanon. The Israeli army is of course superior in armory, technology, and number to either Hamas or Hezbollah or both combined. Because of that superiority and particularly in dealing with the Palestinians, the Israeli army operations include sending troops in Jeeps for incursions or raids inside Palestinian areas. In doing so the Israeli company totaling about 20 soldiers will leave behind 4-5 soldiers at an outpost typically on a hill or a crossroad close to the action. This is intended for rear guarding, communication, and local support. Hezbollah perfected a technique of ambushing this isolated outpost with overwhelming firepower typically killing most of the soldiers and kidnapping 1 or 2.
Flashback to Iran-Palestinian Relationship
For years, Iran and Hezbollah have established contacts with Hamas. Iran sees the Palestinian cause as its cause in the same way that at least some Arabs do. It is not clear how much the Palestinian cause moves the Iranian people at large, but at minimum most of Iranians will sympathize with the cause in so far as it doesn’t hurt their national interest. The religious leadership in Iran is a different story. They truly believe in the Palestinian cause being their cause. It is part of the Iranian regime doctrine to take Israel as Iran’s regional enemy. There are several motives for that:
1- Religious: The current Iranian leadership truly believes that Jihad is a religious duty as long as Jerusalem is occupied. They also truly believe that the Islamic nation has been so weakened and is in need of a major revival. There are deep fundamental beliefs held among the Iranian leadership that Iran and especially this generation is destined to lead the charge on behalf of the rest of the Muslim nation. The Iranian leadership also believes that Arab leaders (not Arab masses though) have sold out and therefore the duty is now upon Iran. These views are held by all of the current Iranian leadership. It is widely believed that the majority of the Iranian nation holds similar views although still sizable segments of the society resent certain aspects of Iran’s religious doctrine particularly those related to dress code and personal freedoms. The Iranian leadership has been recently cautious in enforcing social aspects of their religious doctrine to appease the population. For example, dress codes have been relaxed, authority of Iran’s religious police has been curbed, and even last fall a dress code enforcement campaign was scrapped by President Ahmedi Nijad himself. The flow of oil money is certainly helping to further make the larger population happier and therefore the current policies are believed to enjoy wider support that is less than universal but certainly more than it was few years ago.
1- Religious: The current Iranian leadership truly believes that Jihad is a religious duty as long as Jerusalem is occupied. They also truly believe that the Islamic nation has been so weakened and is in need of a major revival. There are deep fundamental beliefs held among the Iranian leadership that Iran and especially this generation is destined to lead the charge on behalf of the rest of the Muslim nation. The Iranian leadership also believes that Arab leaders (not Arab masses though) have sold out and therefore the duty is now upon Iran. These views are held by all of the current Iranian leadership. It is widely believed that the majority of the Iranian nation holds similar views although still sizable segments of the society resent certain aspects of Iran’s religious doctrine particularly those related to dress code and personal freedoms. The Iranian leadership has been recently cautious in enforcing social aspects of their religious doctrine to appease the population. For example, dress codes have been relaxed, authority of Iran’s religious police has been curbed, and even last fall a dress code enforcement campaign was scrapped by President Ahmedi Nijad himself. The flow of oil money is certainly helping to further make the larger population happier and therefore the current policies are believed to enjoy wider support that is less than universal but certainly more than it was few years ago.
Iranian Demonstration and Burning of Israeli Flag. Religion and Nathionalism in Iran Make Iranians Natural Enemies of Israel.
2- Nationalistic: Iranians have strong sense of national identity. Iran is an ancient nation unlike all of its neighbors who have been created either after the 1st or the 2nd world war or even later (Pakistan after the 2nd, Iraq after the 1st, most Arab gulf states created in the 1970s after Britain’s withdrawal east of Suez). Iranian people take pride in their national identity to the extent of sometimes it being a superiority complex. Even the Shah had grandeur visions for the destiny of the Iranian nation. Iran adopted Islam, but it didn’t adopt Arabic and Farsi persevered as a symbol of national identity. Iran even created its own view of Islam (Shiite) and made it the official sect. This did not happen naturally but rather by an edict by Shah Ismail Safavi who wanted to differentiate Iran from the rest of the Muslim nation. Iranians therefore view their ascending role in the region as natural and they consequently view Israel as a threat (and maybe the only threat) to that ascension. This cause unifies Iranians irrespective of their religious beliefs. The national angle explains why the Iranian people even those who resent the current regime in Iran are squarely supportive of it in its nuclear ambitions.
Relaxation of Dress Code in Iran. Newly Emerging Iranian Middle Class Renegading at Strictly Enforced Dress Code Resulting in Iranian Leadership Relaxing Dress Code Enforcement. Ahmadinejad promised a return to the values of the 1979 Islamic revolution when he was elected last year, prompting many in the establishment to expect rigorous enforcement of Islamic dress and other social codes. But he has been more moderate on social issues than many expected. Early this summer, Ahmadinejad said an annual summer campaign on women's dress codes should be carried out without force this year. According to reports from ISNA, the President has once again called on for a very unusual change for both men and women in Iran thereby not bringing in gender discrimination.
By Israeli accounts and in a likely scenario, Hezbollah trained some Hamas fighters on guerilla warfare. Those fighters were able to slip inside Gaza recently during the occasional forceful opening of passages between Egypt and Gaza. These returning fighters are small in number but they were able to make a qualitative jump in Hamas’ tactics leading to the capture of the Israeli soldier in Gaza. According to the Israelis, the Iranian backing injected breath into the Palastenian resistance capacity. In any case, Palastenians had for 70 years of resistance developed a spirit that has proven to be quite indomitable. Whether it is truly smuggling of weapons and fighters and whether Iran played a key or a supporting role, it doesn't really matter. For the Israelis, the shadow of Iran was growing and the Palastenian resistance was only accentuating that perception (whether it was true or false).
Left, A section of the Egyptian-Gaza Boarder Being Blown Up by Palastenian Militants. Right, Palastenians Waited in Despair for Improvement to Their Conditions After Israel Pulled Out from Gaza. Lines of Palastenians Still Awaited at the Boarder to Cross Back to Home. Occasionally, Hamas Activists Will Blow Up Sections of the Boarder Wall Allowing Uninterrupted Traffic. Bottom, Tunnels Were Also Often Used to Smuggle Arms and People. These Tunnels had Phone Lines Inside and Video Monitoring Capabilities. They Were Not As Most People Believe to Be Crude Holes. It is Believed that Either A Tunnel or a Wall Breakup Was Used to Bring Arms and Trained Personnel Inside Gaza.
Let us now go in flashback again and try to understand the Iranian connection to the Palestinian cause and to Hamas. The Shah’s regime had strong ties with Israel. Both countries had formal diplomatic relationships. Many Israelis visited Iran and there were strong business and intelligence ties. Iran, Israel, and Turkey were part of the tripartite entente in the Middle East to resist Arab nationalism and communism during 1950-1960s. The 1979 Iranian revolution reversed that course completely mostly on religious grounds. The new revolution received Yasser Arafat in Tehran and even handed him the Israeli embassy in Tehran, which became a Palestinian embassy. The relationship between Arafat and Iran grew sour over time though. In the late 70s and early 80s, oil prices were at peak. Rich Arab leaders viewed Iran as a threat particularly given the sizable Shiite population in the Arab Gulf states.
Yasser Arafat meets Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran. After the fall of the monarchy, Iran closed the Israeli embassy in Tehran and turned it over to the PLO.
Gulf Arab countries were at that time essentially bankrolling the Palestinian cause. Arafat’s options were therefore narrowed dramatically and he couldn’t continue to harbor a relation with Teheran and still rely on Arab money. He was told he can either get Iran’s support or Arab money. This got complicated in 1980 when the Iraq-Iran war broke and the polarization that ensued meant Arafat had to take sides. On one side, Arafat had the option of Syria and Iran. On the other, he had all the Gulf countries and Iraq. The relation between Arafat and Syria was never healthy. Syria wanted to exercise patronage over the Palestinian cause. This is grounded in Syrian belief that it really represents the Levant out of which Palestine is only a part.
For Years, Arafat Was the De-Facto Ruler of Beirut. A Feat That is Never Cheap in A Country As Lebanon. Palestinian Revolutionaries Also Indulged in Beirut's Life and Their Expenses Grew Larger.
It is true that the city of Damascus is the soul of the Levant to the extent that Lebanese, Palestinians, Jordanians refer to Damascus as “Al-Sham” or the “Levant” in Arabic – similar to Egyptian referring to Cairo as “Masr” or “Egypt.” Many Palestinian families are inter-married with Syrians ones and therefore the patronage is not entirely political but is also natural. Nevertheless, Arafat wanted to run his own show and take his cause in his own hands. The Iranian-Syrian patronage posed ill for his own independence which he was particularly sensitive to. Moreover, Arafat was thoroughly convinced like many other Arabs that Iraq will come victorious from the war and will have “50 brigades” in Arafat’s own words to fight the Israelis. The road to Jerusalem starts in Tehran according to the conventional thinking at the time. Add the prospect of Arab money to that: at the time all the Palestinian revolutionaries were in exile in Beirut, which is not a cheap city by any stretch of the imagination. Arafat was the de-facto ruler of Lebanon at the time and that cost money (a lot of money) in a country like Lebanon. Arafat needed Arab money badly. The Iran-Arafat axis was gone by 1980 and it didn’t last for long any way. Arafat threw his lot fully behind Saddam Hussein – and so did all Arab rulers at the time – except for Al-Asad.
Arafat and Saddam Hussein. For A While Araft Thought the Iranian Revolution to be His Main Backer. Later, He Had to Pick Sides in the Iran-Iraq War and Had to Choose Iraq.
Flashback to America’s Relationship with Israel-Lebanon-Palestine Triangle
Before Arafat could enjoy any of the bounties of his alliance, Israel invaded Lebanon and he is forced out in exile to Tunisia far away from all the action. Some argue that with Iraq engaged in a brutal war with Iran and Egypt bound with peace treaty with Israel, the Israelis couldn’t miss the ultimate opportunity to find an eternal solution to the Palestinian problem. The solution was simple: the PLO had the only remaining resistance to Israeli expansion and all of its fighters and bases were in Lebanon. With Egypt and Iraq both busy and with the Soviet Union pulling out from the world scene, the ultimate opportunity that Sharon and Begin saw was to destroy PLO completely. Israel gets a green light from Alexander Haig the then US secretary of state to invade Lebanon and destroy the PLO. Alexander Haig informs President Regan that Israel will go on a limited operation to destroy PLO in Southern Lebanon. Alexander Haig did not disclose that the Israeli army really intended to go all the way to Beirut and root the PLO out of Lebanon at worst or at best out of the whole world.
Later on, this deception by Haig costs him his job even before the Lebanon crisis is over. It is said that both Nancy Regan and Donald Regan were furious of the affair and saw the deception as not only failure of duty but also as counter to US strategic objectives in the Middle East. Even though Haig was a Secretary of State, he was a general in the US army with known Hawkish views. His ties in fact were to the school to which Donald Rumsfeld belongs. This is the team that revolted on Henry Kissinger and espoused a belligerent view of the world in which the United States has to rely on its sheer force and military power to achieve its global objectives. Naturally given the great imbalance between Arabs and Israelis militarily, the hawkish school of thought views Israelis as the only ally in the Middle East. This is compounded by strong ties between those espousing hawkish thoughts and the US Israeli lobby.
In 2001, the Late Edward Said wrote: An ominous air is overtaking the Middle East, now that Ariel Sharon has come to and gone from the United States. A striking resemblance to the period before Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon has undoubtedly occurred to anyone with a memory long enough to recall what happened then. The same war criminal, Sharon (who should soon be sharing Milosevic's fate in the Hague) came to see the then Secretary of State Alexander Haig and then went back with what he informed everyone was an American green light. Haig (picture above) for sure was a member of the same hawkish school in the United States...Same school to which Donald Rumsfeld and many others subscribe, which views American power as the supreme means to achieve peace.
Are the Israelis fueling the American hawkish views or are the Americans controlling the Israelis? It is a waste of time in my opinion to really try to understand who is fueling the thoughts of whom. The hawkish views are well grounded in the American culture and it is natural if you view military power as the only course of action is to view Israel as the sole ally in the Middle East. Similarly, on the Israeli side, they certainly like being viewed as the only power in the Middle East because it gives the eternally nervous Israelis their perceived security needs. There is a strong cycle of feedback and found love between the two natural allies. Arab pundits spend too much time analyzing whether Israel controls the US or the US controls Israel. Fact of the matter is America is the superpower and Israel has a strong lobby in the US. The lobby finds listening ears because the lobby has money to spend in elections and because the hawks always found in Israel a strong and capable partner. The Arab side lacks both the money to spend on local US elections (Arab lobby in the US is much weaker than the Israeli one particularly after 9/11 attacks although its nascent power can grow over time) and Arab countries lack the power and the will to help the US achieve its goals.
The Haig affair showed that:
1- The divide between hawks and doves in any US administration is real. Some view the hawkish approach as counter to US national interests.
2- The relationship between Israel and the US is not as many believe it to be. Israel is not always ready to disclose directly its intention to the United States except to those whom it found to be in the same hawkish camp.
3- In the same vein, the hawkish camp whenever they are in power are ready to give Israel significant leeway even at the expense of hiding matters from their own bosses. They do that on the premise that this creates facts on the ground that confronts everybody and becomes a fait accompli. In the case of Alexander Haig the fait accompli was the destruction of the PLO, Israeli hegemony over Lebanon, and the liquidation of the Palestinian problem.
Forensic anthropologists piece through bones at the largest mass grave of Argentina's dictatorship era, found in Cordoba. Thousands of Argentinians "disappeared" into a clandestine world where electric shock torture was a daily routine, young women were gang-raped and most prisoners were disposed of by summary execution. Once again, reminder that this was Argentina in the 1970s and not Iraq in 2006.
Arabs have tendency to see these hawkish views as only directed at them. This is not true. The history of US involvement in Latin America is full of stories comparable to Abu Gharib and Lebanon. The US invaded Latin American countries more times than any Middle Eastern country. The number of dead in Chile and Argentina during the turmoil years was significant. Both Latin America and the Middle East are vital assets for the United States, which for good or for bad has strong hawkish elements in its successive administration and generally hawkish views embedded in the American culture. To give an idea about the American culture, the US is one of very few countries in the world in which the right to carry arms is enshrined in its constitution. This doesn’t mean that Americans are roving streets carrying arms and killing each other – far from the truth. But, the founding fathers realized that a large component of the American dream is taking personal initiative, taking risks, and reaching significant bounties. After all, America (the ultimate bounty) wouldn’t have been discovered without major risk taking and initiative. This explains why someone like Alexander Haig is willing to take a significant risk to achieve what he views as great goals. The world has to accept that what makes the American spirit so energetic and so vital can also be the ingredient for making errors and over-reaching. America has wonderful aspects to it and most important its energy and youth. But youth comes with a price that parts of the world has to pay sometimes.
Bill Gates A Great Aspect of American Go-Getter Culture. The American Entrepreneurial Spirit is Unmatched Anywhere Else in the World. However, It Is the Same Spirit that Went to Iraq -- Another Disastorous Entrepreneurial Project.
Another element of the American culture that needs to be explained is the timing of Haig’s firing. In any other country, failure of a minister to disclose to his president the true scope of an operation such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon would have constituted a ground for immediate firing. However, Haig was not fired until after the Israeli project in Lebanon failed. I have to believe that had the Israeli project succeeded, Haig would have been kept and his gamble would have been viewed as brilliant. In fact, people would have found his behavior even commendable as a way to keep the president with a cause for plausible denial.
Why Did the 1982 Israeli Project in Lebanon Fail?
Israel expelled the PLO out of Lebanon so it was able to achieve its minimum stated objectives. However, it didn’t achieve its full objectives of liquidating the Palestinian problem and exercising hegemony over Lebanon and perhaps even Syria. For a while that seemed possible though. Syria didn’t fire a single bullet when Israel attacked Lebanon. Egypt every day called for Syria to leave Lebanon and let a peace treaty be signed between Israel and Lebanon. Mubarak constanly addressed the Syrians to "lift their hands off Lebanon." In fact Egypt participated in mediating the Palestinian expulsion from Lebanon and even facilitated the infamous 17 May Israeli-Lebanse Peace Treaty, which by all accounts deprived Lebanon of its independence. Saudi Arabia had only money to throw at the table and work at mediating between the different Lebanese factions. None of the major Arab governments was willing or able to intervene in Lebanon and stop the Israeli project there. Nevertheless, in the end the Israeli project failed for multiple reasons:
Israeli Tankers Enter Beirut Summer 1982. This is the Climax of Israel's Project in Lebanon. Failure Started from that Point Onward.
1- The Israeli army had to resort to extreme force in Beirut at an incredibly high cost in civilians. This changed the image of Israel from the under-dog to the cruel invader. Israel could have leveled all of Beirut if it wanted to. However, this was a high price that Israel was not willing to pay. There were intense debates inside the Israeli government with many elements wanting to do just that. However, Begin and Sharon avoided this option not only because of the effect on world image (which some argue that probably both didn’t care much about) of Israel but more importantly because of the effect on the morale inside the Israeli army. We have to understand that an army (even the Israeli one in the eyes of the Arabs) is not a killing machine or a hired bunch of thugs. It does what it does because there is a glorious goal to achieve. And in the eyes of the Israeli army, the goal to achieve is securing Israel from the Arab terrorists. Engaging in razing an Arab city completely, besieging its civilian population, and aiding the Christian militia in massacring Palestinian and Muslim enemies cannot be easily explained as a worthy goal.
Top: Palestinian Troops Leaving Beirut in 1982. Bottom: That Was Followed by Sabra/Shatila Massacres. Christian Militias Entered Sabra and Shatila Refugees Camps in West Beirut Under the Watching Eyes of the Israeli Army to Kill Hundreds of Unarmed Women and Children. The Massacre Put A Dramatic End to Israel Control of Lebanon and Served to Show Israel and the World the High Cost of Achieving Israel's Full Objectives in Lebanon. I remember Crying As A Little Child Upon Hearing News of the Massacre on the BBC World Service.
2- Perhaps the most important factor is the emergence of the Arab street. All of the previous fights (prior to 1982) between Arabs and Israelis were fights with Arab governments and regular armies. Despite all of what we say about the PLO, its fighting qualities and achievements were mediocre at best. PLO was a mere nuisance to the Israeli fighting machine. However, PLO symbolized the Palestinian cause and every now and then was capable of an act of guerilla warfare that posed a challenge to the Israeli absolutism. This has to be put in perspective because Israel like hawks in Washington don’t view security in relative terms but they only rest when they have absolute security. Even small nuisances or even the prospect of posing a challenge cannot be tolerated in the Israeli absolute ideology. This will prove later to be the Achilles heel of Israel’s policies…as will be discussed later.
Top: US Marines Land in Beirut 1982. Bottom: US Marine Compund Bombed in 1983. Afterwards, US Withdrew Its Marines from Lebanon. The Bombing Left More than 200 Marines Killed. This Was the Birth of Hezbollah and A Major Turning Point in the History of the Middle East. Some Will Call the Act Terrorism. Hezbollah Called It Resistance. What Concerns Us Here is that This Act Symbolized the Emergence of the Arab Street As A Major Fighting Force and the Decline of the Arab Governments. Governments When They Fight Are Generally Bound by Treaties and More Important by the Fear of Retaliation. The Arab Street Is Not Bound by Any, Which Makes Its Fighting Fiercer and Less Controllable.
However, in 1982, the Arab street saw its governments as unable and unwilling. Egypt was far away. Saudi Arabia was unable. Iraq was completely engaged in its Iran fight. The Arab street took the matter for the first time in its own hands. The Iranian revolution was reverberating strongly in the Arab street. Like tectonic shifts, it is the movements under the surface that nobody notices is what creates later revolutions and volcanic eruptions. I remember my teacher in middle school (who is a graduate of Al-Azhar and is as Sunni as it can get) telling me that he is inspired by Al-Khomeni and “wait and see…Al-Khomeni will change the world.” The effect of the Iranian revolution was most profound in the two locations where pain and despair was the highest: (a) in Lebanon itself where the Shiite first welcomed the Israeli army but later viewed it as an invading army and (b) in Palestine where years of occupation and humiliation finally aroused the Palestinian population who saw the Iranian revolution succeeding and saw their PLO leadership in no position to save them. In retrospect, the confluence of PLO defeat in Lebanon, and the Iranian revolution succeeding was a liberating force in the Arab street who relied too much on its government or symbols (such as PLO) to solve its causes. Two movements appeared simultaneously, Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is unrealistic to see both movements as an extension of Iran’s designs to control the region. Iran at the time was engaged in a deadly fight with Saddam’s Iraq and had little to spare. In both countries there was a natural ground swell in an Arab street that was fed up with its governments inabilities to fight Israel and saw in Islam the only remaining recourse or ideology. In the same vein that we tried to explain the hawkish element of the American culture and the absolute security element in the Israeli culture (which is paranoid with the prospect of holocaust and in constant search for absolute security), the Arab or Muslim resistance is also strongly founded in their own culture. The Arab street -- that saw one of its major capitals being invaded by a reckless Israeli army and saw its regimes annihilated and quitting the battlefield – that Arab street did not capitulate.
Unfortunately, Arab and Muslim Street Rage Continues Since 1982. The Decline of Arab and Muslim Government, Their Inability to Provide Basic Economic Needs for Their People Added to The Inability to Restore Lost Dignity Still Fuel Arab and Muslim Rage. Weak Governments Also Invite Foreign Interference Further Fueling the Rage. That Rage is Like a Flame Nobody Really Knows When It Will Ignite And Burn And Whether It Will Burn Only A Tree or the Whole Forest. It Even Sometimes Hits a Cartoon Coming from One of the Most Pacifist Countries on Earth -- Denmark. This Rage Acts As A Fertile Ground for Hamas and Hezbollah to Emerge and Provide Outlet for Venting the Deeply Seated Rage.
This is completely unlike say Japan in which the emperor signing capitulation treaty meant the end of the fight for Japanese supremacy over the Western culture and time to adopt that very culture of the enemy. To the contrary, certain elements in the Arab street decided to use whatever tools at its disposal to fight. Fighting for a cause and dying for that cause is enshrined in the Islamic culture. Muslims also take a very long view of history in which crusaders occupation of Arab lands lasted for 200 years and was finally considered only an aberration in the course of history. Compared to that, the history of the state of Israel (less than 60) is even less significant in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims. Hamas and Hezbollah were only representation of these natural aspirations. The Arab street was therefore willing to make significant sacrifices in absence of an acceptable alternative short of fully capitulating to the Israelis. This put the Israeli army at risk because its only course in Beirut was to raze it and the army was not willing to do so. It had to rely on its Christian allies in Lebanon to do the Israeli bidding and have it be packaged as part of the savage civil war in Lebanon. The Arab desire to sacrifice en masse and the Israeli desire to maintain a semblance of a civilized army and avoidance of severe causalities (which were mounting in the hot summer of 1982) led the doors of the Christian militia…as will be discussed in 3 below.
The Patriarch: Pierre Al-Jumaiyel. Upon the Advice of King Hussein, Pierre Authorized His Son Basheer to Cooperate with the Israelis (the Devil As He Used to Say) to Expel the PLO from Lebanon. However, In the Final Moment and When the Israeli Army Was Unwilling to Massacre More Civilians and Wanted Basheer to Do It Instead, Pierre Hesitated. With the Assasination of Basheer, Pierre Realized that the Future of Lebanon Had to Be As Part of Its Arabic and Islamic Surrounding.
3- For a while, it appeared to Israel that the Christian militia in Lebanon would really do their bidding and deliver a Christian Lebanon that is under Israeli patronage giving birth to a new Middle East. In the final moment when the push came to shove, Lebanese Christians decided not to pull the trigger. In interviews with leading Lebanese figures, they all expressed openly that they didn’t pull the trigger because they were afraid that if they do so, Lebanese Christians would cease to become part of the Arab world. They also saw that they would be doing Israel’s own bidding only to lose their position in the Arab world, which is geographically, and culturally where they really belong. That decision proved decisive for the history of the Middle East and I would bet it will easily go in history in a manner similar to the glorious Christian Arabs position during the crusades. In fact, Basheer Al-Joumiel himself told Israeli Prime Minister Begin “if you ask me to do that, Lebanon will cease to be part of the Arab world.” Begin replied saying: “do you really care? My son, I am giving you your ultimate opportunity. You have to do what I am asking you to do.” The Begin-Joumiel meeting ends in a quarrel with Basheer flying back to Jounieh to later be assassinated.
At the time of the six day war June 1967, the USS Liberty sailing around in the Mediterranean.. a NSA listening post, sailing in a dogleg pattern off the Sanai in international waters.. flying an enormous US flag on the back, listed in Jane's.. the whole ship covered with antennas.. sailing slow about 3 knots.. the Israelis did 13 surveillance flights in the morning.. then at 2PM they came in strafing back and forth, dropped a bomb on the ship, napalmed the ship.. then three torpedo boats in firing squad arrangement, fired all their torpedoes.. enough to sink three aircraft carriers.. one hit amidships.. blew a 40 foot hole.. 34 Americans died , hundreds wounded.. then they fired on the lifeboats, fired on people jumping off the ship.. one of the torpedo boats even grabbed one of the US lifeboats and put it on their ship.. The whole episode shows that some in Washington didn't trust the Israelis and therefore sent the best reconaissance ship National Security Agency (NSA) has and likewise the Israelis decided they don't want a big ear listening on all their moves and someone in Washington minding their activities. Picture above shows cannon holes in USS Liberty and the large antennas loom in the background.
4- With Israel discovering the limits of its force and with no allies in Lebanon to do its bidding there, Israel found itself isolated even in Washington. Back in Washington, there has always been an under-current in American policies that doesn’t want Israeli supremacy in the Middle East. As we talked, there are hawkish elements in Washington that see Israel as the only ally. However, there are elements in Washington that don’t really trust the Israelis. This undercurrent is often under-estimated because their views are never expressed in public. Many in different US government agencies do not trust the Israelis. The FBI put AIPAC on watch to end uncovering major espionage plot. This is the same US government that Arabs complain about. Although these undercurrents cannot be expressed in public they are working and in action all the time. For example, the US government during the 1967 war sent its best reconnaissance ship (USS Liberty) to eavesdrop on the Israeli military operation fearing that Israel will expand its operations beyond Egypt to occupy the West Bank which the US repeatedly warned Israel against. This led to Israel bombing of Liberty, occupying the West Bank and surprising everybody in Washington with a fait accompli that the “under-current” couldn’t argue against. However, in 1982 the failure of Israel to achieve its objectives made that under-current more vocal leading the US government to negotiate a safe heaven for the PLO in Tunisia and the start of a dialog between PLO and US. Arabs always ask where those pro-Arab elements are. Arabs will be mistaken to assume that the under current is pro-Arab. It is really not. It is better described as Israeli-suspicious but not necessarily pro-Arab. Many members of the US military admire the Israeli fighting capabilities but in the meantime they worry that the US government gets them involved far too often to help the Israelis. Arabs have to understand the psyche of that under-current in being unable to express itself openly but at the same time being able to exploit Israeli failures (and therefore failures of Israel’s hawkish allies in Washington). The problem is that Arabs rarely give the under-current any chance!
Out Haig, Schultz In. Later, George Schultz Started Dialog with PLO in Tunisia. Although Aborted Later, the Dialog Was Part of the Foundation That Eventually Led to the Oslo Accords.
5- The Israeli lobby in the US itself was surprised with the emergence of the Arab street and the failure of Israel to achieve its objectives. In a contentious meeting in Israel between Israel’s leaders and American Jewish leaders, Prime Minister Begin (who was in his 70s, with a broken hip, and a soul collapsing under the prospect of going down in history as the first failing Israeli leader) appealed for Jewish American continuing support. That is while Jewish American leaders blamed him for the deteriorating Israeli image abroad. After the meeting, Jewish American leaders discovered how broken (at the very top) Israel was at the time and decided to take matters in their own hands. They dispatched Steve Cohen to meet with PLO representatives in Cairo to start what eventually led to the Oslo Accords.
The confluence of all the above elements led to the collapse of Israel’s maximal objectives in Lebanon. Israeli Prime Minister Begin phone George Schultz (US secretary of state who replaced Haig) and asked him: “why do you put PLO now on live support in Tunisia after we dealt them a massive blow in Lebanon?”
Some commentators attribute some of that to the role of the Arab governments in convincing the US to deal with PLO or the peace movement in Israel. Others tend to attribute it to the Israeli peace movement. I tend to disagree with that because neither of which is a primary independent factor. Starting with the peace movement in Israel, the movement was really started as a reaction to Israeli casualties in Lebanon attributed as we talked to the emergent Arab street. So, in of itself, the Israeli peace movement is an effect rather than a cause. There are of course many peaceful and courageous elements in the Israeli society. But a strong peace movement (that is a cause on its own) wouldn’t have fizzled to oblivion when it came to Israeli-Palestinian conflict where the balance of power so out-favors the Palestinians. On the other hands, none of the Arab governments had forces on the ground or any other strong cards capable of influencing the situation in Lebanon. Egypt was facilitating discussions between American Jewish leaders and PLO. Saudi Arabia was facilitating discussions between warring Lebanese factions. Syria was facilitating Iranian help to Hezbollah. Arab governments role was purely facilitation rather than being active players. Again, these are not signs of primary causes but rather of effects.
The Birth of Hamas and Hezbollah and the Re-Emergence of Arab and Muslim Street
It is in that environment that Hamas and Hezbollah were both born almost simultaneously. Both were response to their own Islamic ideology, to the ground swell in the Arab street, and to the failure of Arab governments to engage.
Certainly Hezbollah found a natural ally in Iran. Both are Shiite and both hate Israel and resent Arab governments. Hamas on the other hand was far from so. Hamas relied on support from its financial base in Arab Gulf states (which were squarely opposing Iran during the Iran-Iraq war). Hamas for sure flirted with Iran particularly through its exiled leadership in Syria, but never had the luxury for full engagement with Iran till recently. Hamas really wanted to rely on itself and believed in its ideology being capable of delivering an Islamic victory similar to the one in Afghanistan.
Contrary to Hezbollah, an alliance between Hamas and Iran is not natural. Khaled Meshaal was expelled from Jordan in Sept 1999 to find refuge first in Qatar. Charges against the Hamas officials in Jordan included possession of weapons and explosives for use in illegal acts--an episode that was later repeated in 2006. Hamas donors are all in the Gulf including Kuwait itself (picture below).
The Intifada (which PLO had nothing to do with its beginnings at the very least) was a natural ground swell of which Hamas was the symbol. The Intifada reinforced the Israeli failure in Lebanon and created an intolerable situation. Prime Minister Rabin in private conversation in Cairo would say: “I cannot imagine the Israeli army now becoming a police force going after children in Gaza. I sometimes dream that Gaza will just disappear from the face of the earth and sink into the sea. I get up from these dreams remembering that Gaza is still there.” The defeat of Iraq in 1991, the failure of Israel in Lebanon and in Gaza created conditions that were viewed by many in Washington to be conducive to peace in the Middle East. The US saw an opportunity to create peace finally at US terms. The Soviet Union was collapsing and this was a time of an historic settlement once and for all. American Jewish leaders saw the golden opportunity to save Israel at a time when Arabs are defeated and thus obtain the most favorable conditions for Israel. Israelis were straining under the collapse of their projects and Arabs were in state of chaos. PLO saw it as the golden opportunity to get back in action and live again in the limelight. Hamas saw it as a compromise at terms they didn’t like but the Palestinian street was also exhausted and Hamas donors in the Gulf pressed it significantly to go along.
President Bill Clinton Leaving Press Room After the Collapse of Camp David II. During the Camp David negotiations President Clinton put huge efforts to reconcile the differences between the parties. In the end, Arafat and his Arab backers could not accept a plan minus Jerusalem, which remained as the stickiest point in the discussion. The Israelis on the other hand could not live with a plan that did not include Jerusalem. That was even though the Israeli team was the most dovish Israel could afford. This was an historic opportunity by all measures, however, realities on the ground overwhelmed the prospects.
The collapse of the Middle East peace proved that a compromise between absolutes is impossible. While Arabs were on the surface ready for a compromise, they really wanted all of East Jerusalem. No Arab was ready to make a compromise on that matter. On the other hand, Israel wanted absolute control over East Jerusalem and absolute security simultaneously. US thought that both sides are weakened enough to compromise, but events proved that both sides had a solid core that was not ready to compromise far enough for the other side to accept. Israel on one hand though that it is negotiating a final peace treaty. Arabs on the other hand thought that even after a thousand year a leader will emerge like Salah Al-Din to restore Arab glory and they didn’t want to compromise that prospect (no matter how ridiculous this sounds for a western reader). Israelis also thought that they are coming out winners and therefore the negotiated agreement terms should reflect that. Arabs on the other hand wanted all of East Jerusalem with no Israeli presence in the holly shrines there, which was intolerable for the Israeli fundamental beliefs.
Israeli Army Razed Jenin Refugee Camp. Picture shows what was the main square in Jenin Camp. Targeted assasination of Hamas leaders also ensued on the hope that elimination of resistance leaders will pave the way for peace. Even the crippled Ahmed Yassin didn't escape the killing. Nevertheless, Israel under-estimated the ground swell in the Arab street and the basic tenants of Arab and Islamic resistance especially with its back to wall and with nothing to lose.
The collapse of the peace process led to the Palestinian despair and to Israel feeling that it has to crush Palestinian soul at the core to convince Arabs to accept its peace conditions. Hamas on the other side wanted to prove to Israel that its core fighting capabilities would never die. This led to massive atrocities in 2000-2002 particularly in Jenin. Palestinians responded with suicide attacks on Israel to make their point. Hamas gained ground in the Palestinian hearts and minds. Failure of PLO leadership to bring promised prosperity, their increasing corruption (which was initiated in exile in Beirut – a city conducive to wheeling and dealing more than to fighting a cause – at least for a foreigner), and the failure of the peace process all brought Hamas to government.
Iran's "Good Game" -- Lesson in Realpolitik
We need another flash-back here to go and study Iran post-Khomeni and post the Iran-Iraq war to understand how Iran positioned itself in today’s world.
After the end of the Iran-Iraq war the post-Khomeni leadership in Iran came to few conclusions:
1- Iran has to build its own indigenous capabilities. The West has supplied Iraq with vital
intelligence and weaponry that in the end caused Iran to lose its battle. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran had no strategic supply of arms except the West and that has a price that Iran was unwilling to pay.
2- Iran has to do that slowly but surely and avoid premature confrontation. The model the Iranian leaders talked about was China in which the society is relatively open especially to business but the political ambitions and the social texture are not dictated by the West.
3- The ultimate guarantee to Iran’s security is the possession of nuclear capabilities and advanced technology in all walks of life. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Iran has on the short-term to develop nuclear weapons but like Japan and Germany develop the capability to develop nuclear weapons in case the need arise. In private conversations, the Iranian leadership expressed that this nuclear development ought to happen in secrecy and under the radar screen as much as possible and while avoiding any confrontation until it is a reality.
Events proved Iran to be correct in its assumptions. Saddam Hussein committed a fatal mistake by invading Kuwait. Iraq was destroyed almost completely because of that mistake. Iran stayed on the sideline and memorized the lesson to avoid confrontation with the west until its own capability is built. Iran even cooperated with the US in the Afghanistan invasion. Even when the US finally invaded Iraq, Iran again played ball or wanted to play ball. Iran has played what can be described as a “good game” throughout. It is honestly (no matter how disagreeable the Iranian intentions are) is a masterpiece in achieving your objectives politically and creating a zone of influence without firing a single shot…almost. It is a masterpiece in realpolitik.
2- Iran has to do that slowly but surely and avoid premature confrontation. The model the Iranian leaders talked about was China in which the society is relatively open especially to business but the political ambitions and the social texture are not dictated by the West.
3- The ultimate guarantee to Iran’s security is the possession of nuclear capabilities and advanced technology in all walks of life. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Iran has on the short-term to develop nuclear weapons but like Japan and Germany develop the capability to develop nuclear weapons in case the need arise. In private conversations, the Iranian leadership expressed that this nuclear development ought to happen in secrecy and under the radar screen as much as possible and while avoiding any confrontation until it is a reality.
Events proved Iran to be correct in its assumptions. Saddam Hussein committed a fatal mistake by invading Kuwait. Iraq was destroyed almost completely because of that mistake. Iran stayed on the sideline and memorized the lesson to avoid confrontation with the west until its own capability is built. Iran even cooperated with the US in the Afghanistan invasion. Even when the US finally invaded Iraq, Iran again played ball or wanted to play ball. Iran has played what can be described as a “good game” throughout. It is honestly (no matter how disagreeable the Iranian intentions are) is a masterpiece in achieving your objectives politically and creating a zone of influence without firing a single shot…almost. It is a masterpiece in realpolitik.
Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. The word Ayatollah is often dropped from American dictionary when it comes to Al-Sistani. However, Ali Al-Sistani single-handedly pushed the Americans to institute elections in Iraq even though the Bush administration itself at the early stages of the invasion stated that Iraq was not ready for that.
Let us look at how that happened. We often forget that early in the Iraq invasion, the United States didn’t at all speak of bringing democracy. In fact, the US resisted calls for immediate elections in Iraq. There was nobody talking of election in Washington or in Iraq. It was a singular figure who single-handedly pressed the Americans to hold immediate series of elections in Iraq and that was Ali Al-Sistani. Al-Sistani emerged as the real power broker in Iraq. Of Iranian descent, he firmly believes in Shiite doctrine but at the same time he truly believes (as Al-Khomeni did) that the differences between Shiite and Sunni are minor compared to the challenges facing the Muslim Ummah (nation). Deep inside, Al-Sistani hates the Americans and considers them invaders. However, he realizes that Muslims can lose a battle but eventually win the war. His shyness from cameras, modesty, and a generally moderate approach has won him support as the ultimate leader of Iraqi Shiite.
All of that is good but is not enough to be able to press the world remaining superpower to do something against its own intentions. However, the United States committed a fatal mistake in Iraq. By all estimates, Iraq needed an army of 300,000 to be invaded and controlled. Rumsfeld’s arrogance led to that number being reduced to 100,000 on the assumption that it will be a cake walk for the only remaining superpower fighting an Iraqi army that has been already reduced to rubble by a debilitating blow in 1991 and by years of crippling sanctions. It was true that the organized Iraqi army crumbled during the invasion but the early days of the fighting showed the vulnerability of the American army. Whenever it happened, a small group of armed guerilla fighters were able to stop the advancing American army through guerilla warfare. At the time, the tense relations between the US military and its civilian leadership led to an extremely strained situation on the ground in which the military refused to take policing duties across Iraq leaving it to chaos. The US civilian leadership has only one course of action, which is to rely for policing on the Badr Brigade in the Shiite South and on the Bashmerga in the Kurdish North. After all, they are both ready and trained fighters and more than willing to take upon themselves policing duties. The Badr brigade is an organization that was trained and financed by Iran’s revolutionary guard. By Badr taking control of most of Iraq, it created a powerbase for Iran inside Iraq itself despite all good intentions of the American invasion. America was neither willing nor able to police Iraq without the Badr brigade. Badr became the cornerstone of Iraq’s government. With its spiritual influence (through Al-Sistani) and real influence (through Badr), Iran developed significant influence over Iraq under the watching eyes of the US military.
Iranians bloat that “Iran is now in control of Iraq. We can kick out the Americans anytime .” This may not be entirely correct, but it has a tinge of truth. A private political intelligence report that I recently received clearly says that in the recent negotiations to form an Iraqi government, Iran had a veto power over Sunni personalities that are allowed to join in the government. Iran didn’t want anybody who had to do with the Saddam Hussein government and exercised that veto power judiciously but repeatedly.
Al-Sistani insisted on leveraging American rhetoric on democracy to force United States to hold elections sooner than later. That was in 2004. He left the US with no option but to comply given that it was apparent they need him and Badr to quell the unrest in Iraq. Once again, Iraq proved that even though classical Arab governments and armies can and have crumbled under foreign pressure, the Arab street itself didn’t particularly the hard core of political Islam.
During 2005 and in a telling event of what to come, a British helicopter over Basra was brought down at the same time an American helicopter was shot down in Afghanistan. The technique used was exactly the same with similar weaponry in both cases. This was a time when Britain, France, and Germany were putting mounting pressure on Iran to stop nuclear enrichment. Western intelligence reports indicate that in both cases the technique used was Iranian with Chinese arms smuggled into Iraq and Afghanistan. The aim is to show the West that Iran is capable of turning up the heat if she so desires.
The American quagmire in Iraq was mounting and with it the Iranian influence in the Middle East was similarly building. In early 2005, Saudi Arabian foreign minister told Condoleezza Rice that the US is turning the Middle East to Iran. In late 2005, King Abdullah of Jordan speaks of an Iranian crescent, while in 2006; President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt speaks of Shiite loyalty to Iran rather than to their own countries.
With the quagmire in Iraq, the United States is left with fewer good options in the Middle East. Let us first talk about ruled out options. The military options against Iran is ruled out largely because of the quagmire in Iraq that is draining US military resources, but also because Iran has been diligent in hiding and distributing its nuclear installations (which is another lesson learnt from Saddam Hussein’s failures), and finally because there is no reason to attack Iran (no causus belli). We often forget that so far Iran has broken no treaty or any of its international obligations and often forget that there is no ban on nuclear research and development, which nobody so far has proved that Iran’s program has more than that. Even in world politics, and even superpowers want to find at least a lame excuse to attack another country. Moreover, an attack on a country like Iran will require a massive air assault that has to be sustained for months during which Iran is capable of inflicting major damage on all oil installation in the gulf and choking the flow of oil through the straits of Hormuz. This leads to oil prices shooting beyond $100 or more and resulting in choking the international economy at least for the duration of the war. The US and International economy in most estimates have barely withered a $70 barrel. US companies are still fighting the battle with inflation and pricing. A shooting to $100 or more could prove to be devastating to the world economy. In the 2nd quarter review with Wall Street analysts, the CEO of the largest non-oil American company clearly said that his company still fighting inflation. This leaves military intervention out of the equation.
There is another twist to the military option. Over 15 years since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran has been secretly trying to build its own arsenal. Iranian strategists targeted two types of deterrents:
1- Missiles: Iranians ruled out plane development on the assumption that American aerial capability is unmatched but can only be equalized if a viable missile option is available. Iran started by acquiring North Korean missile technology. North Korea’s missiles (which are derivatives of Russia’s old ones) are known to lack accuracy. I have to believe that Iranians equipped the North Korean missiles with what seems like control systems rigged from the old American missiles bought by the Shah. In extreme patience, Iranian scientists must have worked to reverse-engineer every electronic chip that was on the American missiles. Iranians are famous of patience. During the American hostage crisis in the American embassy in Tehran, the Americans shreded every document before the Iranians attacked. However, the Iranians assembled all the documents back with sheer patience from shreds the largest of which was less than ½ mm long. We are talking about thousands of documents that were completely re-assembled. Reality is that most of America’s progress in control systems occurred as a result of the space program and that progress was mostly absorbed in defense systems by 1979. Iranians probably discovered that while the algorithms stayed mostly the same, the control boards themselves became much faster in the 1980s and 1990s (during the computing revolution). By reverse-engineering the algorithms and equipping them on more modern and faster computer chips (which are widely available in the market), the Iranians most likely were able to develop a strong missile package that is at par with modern Western technologies. Iran has even decided to take a leap into modern missile propulsion. It is worth noting that Iran is one of very few countries in the world with active program in pulse-detonated propulsion.
A photo taken off Iranian TV shows the test-firing in Gulf waters of a new Iranian high-speed underwater missile capable of destroying huge warships and submarines while evading radar detection. There was no eay way to telll whether Iranians were bluffing about their capabilities or not. Many western intelligence sources believed that Iran was exaggerating its capabilities to maximize political gain. The sixth war provided first glimpses of Iran's true capabilities.
2- Nuclear: As we discussed, Iran viewed the nuclear option as vital for its security. Iran saw the advantage of nuclear energy as being the future of energy in the world for it being the only viable option after oil for large-scale production of clean energy. Nuclear energy enables Iran to export its vast resources of natural gas (2nd only to Russia in the world and more than double what Qatar has) while amply supplying its own growth. It is interesting to note how the West is rallying against that now while during the Shah, Siemens was more than happy to build a nuclear reactor for him.
3- Unmanned airplanes: Iran has developed unmanned airplanes both for reconnaissance and for bombing strategic targets.
It is interesting to note the absence of bio-chemical weapons from the Iranian developments. That is despite chemical weapons infame as being the poor man's weapon. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian human waves were hit hard by Saddam's chemical weapons. Iranian leadership developed a hate for chemical weapons apparently on religious and ideological grounds. Iran also watched Saddam's chemical stockpile neutralized by American bombardment while he was sitting unable to use it because of the threat of massive American retaliation.
Zilzal Missile Developed by the Iranians and Believed to be in the Hands of Hezbollah. Zilzal appears to be a SCUD derivative but is equipped with modern control system to increase accuracy. Zilzal is capable of reaching any oil or military installation in the Gulf.
Iran was happy to supply most of its sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah. The strategic alliance was important for Iran to leverage a strategic asset that is that close to Israel. For years, Iran supplied Hezbollah with 100s of millions worth of weaponry in addition to extensive training programs. There is even the probability that Hezbollah supplied Iran with sophisticated weaponry acquired from the demoralized Israeli army in Lebanon either through money or by raiding and acquiring the weapons directly.
The combination of technology and Hezbollah, Iran has made the military option virtually impossible. If US attacks Iran, Iran can inflict major damage on US bases in the Gulf, Iraq will turn into an inferno, oil will stop to flow, and Israel will be attacked with precision. Essentially, Iran can create a doomsday scenario.
It is in that background that Hamas won the elections in an exhausted Palestine. Hamas’ fighters in Gaza were not natural allies to Iran. A lot of people talk about Khaled Mishaal now being the "Syrian" leadership of Hamas that is responsible for strong Hamas-Iran connections. We often forget that Khaled Mishaal did not reside in Syria until after the Israelis attempted to assassinate him in Amman and his 1999 expulsion from Jordan. Even when Mishaal left Jordan, his first destination was Qatar. Also, most of Hamas’ support is in the Gulf were sentiments against run or at the very least suspicion of Iran runs high. Why did Hamas then finally turn to Iran?
Why Did Hamas Finally Engage with Iran?
Every year, Iran holds one form or another of conferences of Islamic solidarity in which Islamic resistance movements from around the world attend, including Hamas, Muslim brotherhood, and even the ex-leftist Jabril faction of the PLO. Iran also gives money to all of these movements on an annual basis. This is part of Iran’s fundamental belief in its Islamic duty. Nevertheless, it also gives Iran an ability to win the hearts and minds of people and achieve political ends.
The Conference Weapon. Iran has used conferences to attract resistance movements all around the Muslim world even those who disagree with Iran. Picture shows Hamas together with ex-leftist leader Mohammad Jebril in a conference in Iran. On a personal note, conferences are some sort of a fashion in the Middle East. Every time I go there I have to observe the numerous conferences going on some on nonsense subjects like the "Effect of Globalization on Sports in Arabian Gulf" !
Hamas attended these conferences, however, it didn’t go far in its relationship with Iran until 2004 after the Israeli re-occupation of Jenin and the killing of all of its leadership in Gaza including Sheikh Ahmed Yassin himself. Hamas was badly cornered at the time and felt that without access to technology and power, it will be annihilated. There was limited number of Palestinian fighters at the time training with Hezbollah in Lebanon but with no means of sending them inside the territories. That is the time when Sharon embarked on his vision for setting Israel’s boarders. Sharon thought that with Arabs now defeated in Iraq (again!) and with a US administration that is as supportive as it could ever be (mainly composed of Israel hawkish allies in Washington), he can now embark on unilateral liquidation of the Palestinian cause. Even President Mubarak told Mahmoud Abbas that their only solution is with Sharon and that Egypt could accept Israeli self-defined boarders if no peace treaty emerges between Israel and the Palestinians. President Mubarak hinted at that in 2005 during a press conference. Hamas saw the limit of what Arab governments can deliver. When Hamas took power, the American pressure on Arab governments was so severe to the extent that Egypt couldn’t hold official meetings with Hamas foreign minister. Even worse, Egypt accepted all of Israel conditions for a Gaza withdrawal at the futile objections of Hamas. Sharon saw Hamas in power as the golden opportunity to define boarders, declare a token Palestinian state, and in his own words to a visiting diplomat “disengage from the Palestinians so they can eat themselves.”
Without Sharon knowing he gave a golden opportunity to Iran! Israel always wanted to abandon Gaza. According to Israeli strategic analysis, Gaza’s barren desert has no strategic value and the Israeli outposts in Gaza stretches the Israeli army so much trying to defend them. Therefore, a complete pull from Gaza is certainly painful because it reflects another setback for Israel’s Middle East dream, however, when a benefit/cost analysis is done, it makes sense. It was viewed that only Sharon is capable of making such a move and convincing the eternally paranoid Israelis that it will be all right in the end. The pull back from Gaza and the subsequent gate bursts in Rafah enabled Hamas to smuggle highly trained fighters inside Gaza. Those fighters changed the political landscape in the Middle East because finally they enabled the Palestinians inside the territories to confront the Israeli army with superior weaponry and tactics. Hamas did that because it had no other option. All of its leaders were massacred in the 2 years before and all of its Arab supporters were putting extreme pressure on it to accept Israel. Jordan severed its relationships with Hamas, Egypt boycotted its representatives. Hamas was left with its back to the wall and had to find an exit somehow. In a recent lecture given by George Soros (the Hungarian-American Jewish billionaire) in Aspen, he lamented that Hamas indigenous leadership in Gaza should have been given a chance to create a wedge with its exiled leadership. Perhaps this is too much of retrospective self-righteousness.
Sequence of Events After Shalit’s Kidnapping
Enough of the flashbacks now and let us get to the actual actions on the ground.
After Iranian-trained Hamas fighters arrived in Gaza and kidnapped an Israeli soldier using Hezbollah guerilla tactics, Israel retaliated harshly. Hezbollah kidnapped many Israeli soldiers in the past without this harsh retaliation from Israel. As late as 2000, Hezbollah kidnapped 3 Israeli soldiers and Israel eventually agreed to prisoner exchange brokered by the German government negotiated with Hezbollah. What had changed since then? Even more so, when we go back few years earlier, in 1995 an Israeli soldier was kidnapped right after the signing of the Oslo peace accords and again that kidnapping did not cause such a reprisal by the Israelis. At the time, Rabin called the Egyptians and there was a stir. The Israeli intelligence believed the kidnapped soldier to be in the newly liberated Palestinian areas. It ended up not and the Israeli soldier was found to be in a village still under Israeli occupation. Again, what changed from these times?
The following factors have changed:
1- Surprisingly, Israel feels much more vulnerable now than in the past. Many Arabs will find that surprising, however, it is he truth. In the 1990s, except for very few on the fringes (such as Al-Qaida), Arabs were mostly awed by the American show of force in Iraq in 1991. Almost everyone in the Arab world got a strong message of “don’t mess with the US or with Israel.” The collapse of the Soviet Union and what appeared to be the overwhelming technology of America and Israel were both a strong deterrence for the vast majority of Arabs. This was even facilitated by the atmosphere of peace seeking in the region. Nevertheless, awe shouldn’t be interpreted as Arabs all of a sudden losing their constants. The vast majority of Arabs maintain deeply seated feelings of mistrust toward Israel and toward American intentions. However, the awe resulting from the 1991 Gulf War caused a period of what can be called loss of direction. The Arab compass was there with its entire historical tank, but the 1991 war acted as a strong magnet that destabilized the compass. This is what was seen as an ultimate opportunity to make peace in the region as discussed before. This atmosphere is very different than in 2006 where America (truly seen by Arabs as the ultimate guarantor of Israeli security) is entangled in an endless web in Iraq. Its fighting capacity (which brought awe in 1991) is coming to a screeching halt in Iraq. Even worse, in 1991, Israel was occupying Lebanon. In 2000, Israel was forced to withdraw from Lebanon under intense pressure from Hezbollah. The American-Israeli alliance --that for good or for bad Arabs view as the biggest force in the region-- is viewed by the Arab world as weaker than ever. It is one thing to be awed by somebody, it is another that you test him in war and you find that “it is actually not as strong as you thought him to be.” This perception puts Israel in a vulnerable position because half of winning any war is the awe that you leave in your enemy before the war. If you are successful in awing your enemy, you essentially incapacitated half of that enemy’s potential. Even in 1967 and despite all the Arab propaganda, Arab fighters knew deep inside that they were weaker than Israel. That was half of losing the battle.
After Iranian-trained Hamas fighters arrived in Gaza and kidnapped an Israeli soldier using Hezbollah guerilla tactics, Israel retaliated harshly. Hezbollah kidnapped many Israeli soldiers in the past without this harsh retaliation from Israel. As late as 2000, Hezbollah kidnapped 3 Israeli soldiers and Israel eventually agreed to prisoner exchange brokered by the German government negotiated with Hezbollah. What had changed since then? Even more so, when we go back few years earlier, in 1995 an Israeli soldier was kidnapped right after the signing of the Oslo peace accords and again that kidnapping did not cause such a reprisal by the Israelis. At the time, Rabin called the Egyptians and there was a stir. The Israeli intelligence believed the kidnapped soldier to be in the newly liberated Palestinian areas. It ended up not and the Israeli soldier was found to be in a village still under Israeli occupation. Again, what changed from these times?
The following factors have changed:
1- Surprisingly, Israel feels much more vulnerable now than in the past. Many Arabs will find that surprising, however, it is he truth. In the 1990s, except for very few on the fringes (such as Al-Qaida), Arabs were mostly awed by the American show of force in Iraq in 1991. Almost everyone in the Arab world got a strong message of “don’t mess with the US or with Israel.” The collapse of the Soviet Union and what appeared to be the overwhelming technology of America and Israel were both a strong deterrence for the vast majority of Arabs. This was even facilitated by the atmosphere of peace seeking in the region. Nevertheless, awe shouldn’t be interpreted as Arabs all of a sudden losing their constants. The vast majority of Arabs maintain deeply seated feelings of mistrust toward Israel and toward American intentions. However, the awe resulting from the 1991 Gulf War caused a period of what can be called loss of direction. The Arab compass was there with its entire historical tank, but the 1991 war acted as a strong magnet that destabilized the compass. This is what was seen as an ultimate opportunity to make peace in the region as discussed before. This atmosphere is very different than in 2006 where America (truly seen by Arabs as the ultimate guarantor of Israeli security) is entangled in an endless web in Iraq. Its fighting capacity (which brought awe in 1991) is coming to a screeching halt in Iraq. Even worse, in 1991, Israel was occupying Lebanon. In 2000, Israel was forced to withdraw from Lebanon under intense pressure from Hezbollah. The American-Israeli alliance --that for good or for bad Arabs view as the biggest force in the region-- is viewed by the Arab world as weaker than ever. It is one thing to be awed by somebody, it is another that you test him in war and you find that “it is actually not as strong as you thought him to be.” This perception puts Israel in a vulnerable position because half of winning any war is the awe that you leave in your enemy before the war. If you are successful in awing your enemy, you essentially incapacitated half of that enemy’s potential. Even in 1967 and despite all the Arab propaganda, Arab fighters knew deep inside that they were weaker than Israel. That was half of losing the battle.
In 2006, Arabs finally have or were on their way to shedding the inferiority complex they always felt toward the Israelis. Israel feeling vulnerable and feeling that its ultimate security umbrella (US and its own army) is itself vulnerable, lacks self-confidence and therefore is more susceptible of making uncalculated moves.
2- Second factor is more personal. We have to look at the personality of the 3 Israeli prime minister during the 3 kidnapping episodes (1995, 2000, and 2006). We often forget that history is the collective acts of people who are --- no matter their positions – are after all humans. In 1995, it was Rabin who was an Israeli general and is considered one of the fathers of Israel’s 1967 stunning victory. Rabin didn’t need to prove himself in the eyes of the Israeli public. In 2000, the prime minister was Ehud Barak. Barak reached the highest rank an officer in Israel can reach to become chief of staff of the Israeli army. He also served in Special Forces and participated in under-cover operations in which he by himself participated in killing Palestinian operatives in Beirut. Because of his service, Barak is still the highest decorated officer in Israel. Again, Barak could feel that he is part of the Israeli army which is THE institution revered by all Israelis.
2- Second factor is more personal. We have to look at the personality of the 3 Israeli prime minister during the 3 kidnapping episodes (1995, 2000, and 2006). We often forget that history is the collective acts of people who are --- no matter their positions – are after all humans. In 1995, it was Rabin who was an Israeli general and is considered one of the fathers of Israel’s 1967 stunning victory. Rabin didn’t need to prove himself in the eyes of the Israeli public. In 2000, the prime minister was Ehud Barak. Barak reached the highest rank an officer in Israel can reach to become chief of staff of the Israeli army. He also served in Special Forces and participated in under-cover operations in which he by himself participated in killing Palestinian operatives in Beirut. Because of his service, Barak is still the highest decorated officer in Israel. Again, Barak could feel that he is part of the Israeli army which is THE institution revered by all Israelis.
Olmert's Son Shaul. Shaul signed on a petition calling for Israeli soldiers to refuse to serve in the occupied territories. 30 years ago this would have been unthinkable for an Israeli to do, not to speak of the prime minister son. A sign of the change of times in Israel.
Now move forward to 2006 and we come to Ehud Olmert: Olmert served with the Israel Defense Forces in the Golani combat brigade. While in service he was injured and temporarily released. He underwent many treatments. Later he completed his military duties as a journalist for the IDF magazine BaMahane. During the Yom Kippur 1973 war he joined the headquarters of Ariel Sharon as a military correspondent. Already a Knesset member, he decided to go through an Officer's course, at the age of 35, in 1980. This episode in his life shows that Olmert always felt that he didn’t have enough oomph as Americans say or is not man enough as Arabs say.
Most of Olmert’s reputation was based on the years he spent as mayor of Jerusalem. From 1993 to 2003, Ehud Olmert served two terms as Mayor of Jerusalem, the first member of Likud or its precursors to hold the position. During his term in office, he devoted himself to the initiation and advancement of major projects in the city, the development and improvement of the education system, and the development of road infrastructure. He also spearheaded the development of the light rail system in Jerusalem, and the investment of millions of sheqals in the development of mass transportation options for the city. In any other country, these achievements land people into high positions except for Israel where all prime ministers are judged only based on their affiliation and contribution to the security of the state of Israel viz a viz the Arabs. Olmert was always living in the shadow as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict goes. Again, in his own eyes, Olmert may see himself as in search for credentials in what he knows the only metric the Israeli public measures his leaders: dealing strongly with Arabs.
Ariel Sharon as a Young Officer. Even as a General, Sharon disobeyed his commanders and launched an attack on Egyptian lines in 1973. The attack was a gamble but eventually succeeded. The success strengthened what was then nascent dictatorial tendancy.
We also have to remember that Olmert became prime minister in conditions that can at the very least be described as unusual. Let us flash back again to that time. Feeling vulnerable and able to make peace with Arabs, the Israeli public voted Ariel Sharon into office. Israelis know very well that Ariel Sharon is the Arabs most hated yet most feared personality. The argument was if the army by itself and the Americans are not enough of deterrence for Arabs, then Sharon – the butcher of Lebanon as Arabs call him will be. Sharon at the same time is a revered hero for the Israeli public and is widely credited with winning back the 1973 war for Israel after the initial Arab successes. Sharon embarked on a policy of extreme use of force while putting on the table a plan to unilaterally redraw Israel’s borders on its own terms. Sharon’s plan is his same old plan from the 1990s while he was in opposition, which is a modified version of what is known as Allon’s plan. In Allon’s plan, Israel—discovering that it cannot expel Palestinian in the West Bank—isolates Palestinians into 3-4 islands or cantons with the Jordan River under Israel’s hands. Sharon made a political breakthrough when US President Bush acceded to his plan and gives guarantees that major Israeli settlement blocks cannot be abandoned. Sharon takes that guarantee and embarks on executing his plan.
Sharon Sometimes Described as the Last King of Israel. Sharon viewed himself as the only remaining capable leader of Israel. Throughout his career, Sharon was also known for dictatorial way of leading and a distaste of opposition. In the end, this cost him his health and life. Sharon refused doctors advice to rest after heart surgery. With high cholestrol, huge overweight, and high blood pressure, he even refused to diet.
For those who know Sharon, they speak of his vision of himself as the last true warrior in the state of Israel. He speaks of Ben Gurion as the creator of the state and then of himself as the creator of ultimate peace for the state. Sharon also tolerated no opposition. Even as a young officer, Sharon never tolerated disagreements. He was always “Mr. Right” at least to himself. There are forests destroyed and tons of ink spelled speaking of friction between Sharon and his leaders during the 1973 war and how he always refused to obey orders and tolerated no dissent. Therefore, Sharon never wanted strong leaders around him in his cabinet. Sharon formed Kadima really because the extreme right in his old party (Likud) led by Benjamin Netanyahu was viewed by Sharon as an obstacle to his grandiose plan. It is said that Netanyahu always disagreed with Sharon during cabinet meetings and Sharon got fed up with that. Sharon embarked on doing something that never happened in Israel: shaping a new party and custom-making it to fit one personality – that is Sharon himself.
Sharon's Cabinet. All lights were on Sharon himself and everybody else was in his shadow. Sharon was the strongest man in Israel.
The 3 top personalities in the new party were: Olmert, Shimon Perez, and Tzipi Livni. Shimon Perez never succeeded in winning elections in Israel on his own credentials. Olmert is the man in the shadow as we explained. Livni is a woman, a newcomer to Israeli politics, a lawyer by profession, and her key role in Israeli politics is the dealmaker (Al-Khatba in Arabic terminology) between the different warring parties in Israel. None of the top 3 is a real threat to Sharon and that is the way he wanted it to be. However, destiny had its own designs. Sharon is forced out of the scene leaving the senior most of the 3 personalities to become the Prime Minister. Although the position has its own aura, Olmert himself still views himself as the man in the shadows who now finally has a chance to prove out himself to everybody.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert with His Wife Aliza. Aliza was a dove even before they married 35 years ago. Olmert's son Shaul also refused to serve the army's rule over the Palestinians. And his daughter Dana, who is openly gay and even further left than others in the family. It wasn't just the household that shaped the man. Many of the votes for Olmert's Kadima party came from Israelis who, like him, had concluded that the right's dream of ruling a "Greater Israel" including the West Bank and Gaza Strip would perpetuate the war with the Palestinians and eventually drown the Jewish state in an Arab majority. The Israeli dream is finally testing limits.
There is another more personal twist to the story. Ehud Olmert's wife, Aliza, is a writer of novels and theater plays, as well as an artist. It has been rumored that Aliza was a (founding) member of the Israeli left wing organization Women in Black, but this rumor is unsubstantiated. Still, Aliza is known to be more left-leaning in her politics than her husband. She claimed to have voted for him for the first time in 2006. Although that is too personal and we have no intention of going into this level of personal details, it could be though that Olmert wants to prove his mettle to his own family. This is a complex situation. A vulnerable state led by a vulnerable cadre of leadership who knows deep inside they lack credentials and they are out to prove themselves on the job.
3- Third factor is again deep inside Israel. There has been a change in the Israeli composition from 1973 or 1967 to now. In 1973 or 1967, Israel was a 3rd world country equipped with a 1st class army. The average Israeli was poor, and believed in fighting for his own land to defend the state. Now, the average Israeli is rich (average income in Israel is comparable to most European countries) and knows there is a lot in life to enjoy other than fighting. Olmert family itself is a sign of the new Israel. Olmert has four biological children and an adopted daughter. The oldest daughter, Michal, holds a Masters in psychology and leads workshops in creative thinking. Their daughter Dana is a lecturer in literature at the Tel Aviv University and the editor of a literature series. She is a self-identified lesbian and lives with her partner in Tel Aviv. Her parents are accepting of her sexual identity and partner. Danna is moderately active in the Jerusalem branch of the Israeli human rights organization Machsom Watch. Their son Shaul married an Israeli artist and lives in New York. After Shaul was through with military service, he signed a petition of the Israeli left-wing organization Yesh G'vul. He later became the spokesman of Beitar Jerusalem FC, his father's favorite football team. This team is often associated with the Israeli right. Ehud's younger son Ariel, who did not serve in the Israeli Army, studies French literature at the Sorbonne in Paris. Shuli is the prime minister’s adopted daughter. She was orphaned from her mother at birth. The careers and lives of all of the prime minister’s children is a far cry from the 1960 and 1970s when most Israelis were farmers, factory workers, and servicemen and women. Israel at that time didn’t have the luxury of forming artistic societies, human rights organizations, or changing sexual identities. Israeli society is now by far part of the West both in income and in cultural life to which fighting is increasingly a distant memory. However, this shouldn’t be confused with non-militancy, in the same vein as Arab’s awe shouldn’t be confused with disappearance of mistrust. The militancy is still there in the Israeli society, however, the psyche now is to try to achieve it as the lowest possible cost. This makes Israel more inclined than ever to engage in aerial campaigns while offering its people maximum possible protection.
4- Last factor but far from being the least is Iran. Israel built its survival model in a region that by all means simply hates it and hates its mere presence on one security theory: Israel is capable of reaching and defeating anybody in the region. This doctrine and the capabilities behind it led the Americans to throw their lot fully behind Israel.
4- Last factor but far from being the least is Iran. Israel built its survival model in a region that by all means simply hates it and hates its mere presence on one security theory: Israel is capable of reaching and defeating anybody in the region. This doctrine and the capabilities behind it led the Americans to throw their lot fully behind Israel.
It is interesting to recall the story of Harry Truman. Another flashback to Harry Truman who is the US president who recognized the state of Israel minutes after its announcement in May 1948. It is widely known that Truman had a Jewish friend in his hometown in St. Louis and in a widely repeated story; it is that Jewish friend who made Truman recognize Israel. However, we often forget that Truman’s Jewish friend appealed to him insistently to meet an Israeli delegate. After the meeting, Truman said that he doesn’t really understand what these guys want. In fact, Truman after the meeting made very anti-Semitic statement about all Jews. Truman recognized Israel de facto and not de juri (meaning he acknowledge that a state was born with facts on the ground but not with legal grounds). Even more so, Truman thought the Israelis will be overwhelmed by Arabs eventually but that he will recognize Israel only de facto so he can claim to the Arabs later on that he was only recognizing facts on the ground. The primary factor for Truman’s to recognize Israel was that he didn’t want the Soviets (who recognized Israel first) to have any advantage on the world scene. Truman essentially was hedging his bets at least initially. However, by January 1949 and after the Arabs’ sounding defeat, the US recognized Israel de juri. The Americans were impressed by Israeli efficiency and capabilities vs. the hapless Arabs. They believed they could only trust the Israelis competence and capabilities. This was extremely facilitated by the strong influence of American Jews who lent their support to Israel and leveraged their strong position in most upper echelons of American society (media, universities, Hollywood, lawyers, Washington operatives) to aid the state of Israel. This alliance between Israel and American became the linchpin of American policy in the region.
Iranian Parade in New York City. The Iranian American community is one of the wealthiest ethnic communities in the United States. Their influence and wealth particularly in the San Francisco Bay area is significant. In the early days after 9/11, Iranians residing in the US (even illegally) objected to the registeration and eventually got what they asked for.
Flash-forward to 2006, this status quo of Israeli-US alliance is being challenged and is being challenged openly by Iran. Not only did Iran achieve a controlling position in Iraq, Iran is openly developing nuclear capabilities. Even more so, the United States as we described earlier has no military option in dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, not to speak of the much weaker Israel having any illusions about confronting the Iranians militarily by themselves. Iran is not only embarking on a nuclear program. It has also an ambitious technology development program that is supported by a strong infrastructure of educated and business class. Iran under the Shah was enjoying a strong position next to Israel in American Middle East policy. Some would even argue that Iran under the Shah had comparable influence in Washington to the Israeli lobby. Droves of Iranians flocked to the US for education. Many Americans worked in Iran and took it as a second home. Every American I meet who is in his 50s tells me an encounter with Iran or with an Iranian under the Shah. None of them speak of an encounter with Israel—there is a massive size disparity between Iran’s 70 millions and Israel’s five. Israel must be thinking that there is a chance that a strong Iran could regain its position in the US that it used to hold under the Shah with the big difference that at the time of the Shah, Iran was complimentary to Israel, now it is exclusionary. Israel also must be thinking that with all the American headaches in Iraq, a re-vitalized relation with Iran could be the cure to that headache. Iran for sure is part of a solution to the American debacle in Iraq. Israel’s nightmares go even further. Israel knows that the American-Chinese cooperation started in the 1970s with the famed Kissinger’s visit to China despite China being (and still is) a communist country. China even became the most preferred trade partner for the United States even in the 1980s at the height of Regan’s campaign against communism. China provided America with two cures: (a) a cure to Vietnam in which the US could withdraw from there to the Philippines and Japan on the Asian shores with no threat by China or by Chinese supported forces, and (b) China’s breakaway from the Soviet Union was the first nail in the coffin that led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. Israel knows that Iran could provide the US with parallel cures both to (a) its headache in Iraq and (b) its problems with political Islam and extreme movements in the Middle East. Even though Iran has different culture than the US, China also has a different culture than the US and still both countries do business really well with each other. It is widely believed that the incentives provided to Iran by the US and its allies include accession of Iran to the World Trade Organization, treatment of Iran as most preferred trade partner by the EU, and a wide array of other lucrative incentives including access to advanced technology. Even worse from the Israeli perspective, Iran gets to keep its research in nuclear and doesn’t have to abandon its ambitions. In Israel’s views, in the absence of a military solution with Iran, the US will eventually have to settle with Iran and that got to be at the expense of Israel. This got to be a nightmare for the Israelis. Israel’s worried don’t stop there. Iran has a strong expatriate community in the United States. For example, many of top vice presidents in American companies are from Iranian heritage. It is true that many disagree with the current regime in Iran but they all strongly love Iran. It is conceivable that this expat community can form a lobby that is parallel to the Jewish lobby – may be not now but the prospect is there. In case of renewed trade between US and Iran, the Iranian expat community can act as a strong bridge between the two countries. All of these factors make the Israelis feel that their very future survival is at stake and they had to do something.
With these 4 factors in the background, Israel wanted to prove to itself and to its American ally (who is currently paralyzed in Iraq) that it can do something:
1- It can neutralize Hezbollah, which is one of the factors (but not the only) preventing the US from taking military action against Iran. In Israeli calculation this can be a game changer in the region because it may change the equation back again in favor of using force against the Iranians.
2- It proves to the region that even though it withdrew from Lebanon under Hezbollah pressure, it can essentially destroy Hezbollah and prove its manhood in a region that according to Israeli beliefs only understand the language of force.
3- It deters its ally from flirting with the Iranians.
This explains the rapid and violent Israeli response to the Hamas kidnapping of Shalit.
After Shalit’s kidnapping, Israel used extreme force against Hamas and its leadership in Gaza and against the Palestinian civilians themselves. Israeli reprisals became so extreme that Hamas Gaza leadership appealed to the Egyptians for help. A Hamas Gaza leader told an Egyptian counterpart that: “please take that guy and just let us get back our lives.” He was speaking of Shalit. However, the hard-core Iranian-trained Hamas fighters who captured Shalit wanted a fight till the end. Egypt mediated a settlement as usual. Israel agreed to freeing some Palestinian captives in its prisons in exchange for Shalit. Israel as customary didn’t specify the number of those to be freed, their names, or a timetable for freeing them. Hamas Gaza leadership agreed to these conditions and the Egyptians thought they got a deal. However, Hamas Damascus leadership and its rank and file in Gaza declined the deal. The Hamas leadership had nothing to offer since they didn’t even know where the captive soldier is. Iranians indicated that releasing the soldier under these “Oslo-like” conditions would be a “foolish mistake.” Egyptians get really upset with Hamas. The Israelis use the event as a wedge and tell the Egyptians: “I told you. Hamas is run by Iran and it is Iran who told them not to agree to the deal.” The Egyptians get even angrier with Hamas and instruct one of their exiled leaders to leave Egypt since Egypt can no longer provide him protection. This was a tip from the Israelis that all Hamas leadership in exile is collaborating with the Iranians. Egypt goes and as usual informs the Saudis of the episode and Saudi Arabia becomes even further agitated with Iranian interference in the region.
With these 4 factors in the background, Israel wanted to prove to itself and to its American ally (who is currently paralyzed in Iraq) that it can do something:
1- It can neutralize Hezbollah, which is one of the factors (but not the only) preventing the US from taking military action against Iran. In Israeli calculation this can be a game changer in the region because it may change the equation back again in favor of using force against the Iranians.
2- It proves to the region that even though it withdrew from Lebanon under Hezbollah pressure, it can essentially destroy Hezbollah and prove its manhood in a region that according to Israeli beliefs only understand the language of force.
3- It deters its ally from flirting with the Iranians.
This explains the rapid and violent Israeli response to the Hamas kidnapping of Shalit.
After Shalit’s kidnapping, Israel used extreme force against Hamas and its leadership in Gaza and against the Palestinian civilians themselves. Israeli reprisals became so extreme that Hamas Gaza leadership appealed to the Egyptians for help. A Hamas Gaza leader told an Egyptian counterpart that: “please take that guy and just let us get back our lives.” He was speaking of Shalit. However, the hard-core Iranian-trained Hamas fighters who captured Shalit wanted a fight till the end. Egypt mediated a settlement as usual. Israel agreed to freeing some Palestinian captives in its prisons in exchange for Shalit. Israel as customary didn’t specify the number of those to be freed, their names, or a timetable for freeing them. Hamas Gaza leadership agreed to these conditions and the Egyptians thought they got a deal. However, Hamas Damascus leadership and its rank and file in Gaza declined the deal. The Hamas leadership had nothing to offer since they didn’t even know where the captive soldier is. Iranians indicated that releasing the soldier under these “Oslo-like” conditions would be a “foolish mistake.” Egyptians get really upset with Hamas. The Israelis use the event as a wedge and tell the Egyptians: “I told you. Hamas is run by Iran and it is Iran who told them not to agree to the deal.” The Egyptians get even angrier with Hamas and instruct one of their exiled leaders to leave Egypt since Egypt can no longer provide him protection. This was a tip from the Israelis that all Hamas leadership in exile is collaborating with the Iranians. Egypt goes and as usual informs the Saudis of the episode and Saudi Arabia becomes even further agitated with Iranian interference in the region.
Why Did Hezbollah Interfere?
With the Egyptian-brokered deal faltering, Hezbollah interferes in an attempt to extract better settlement for Hamas. Hezbollah attacked Israeli position and captured 2 more Israeli soldiers. According to Hezbollah, Hezbollah calculates that this operation:
1- Props Hamas leadership after the Egyptians turn away from them.
2- Further humiliates the Israeli army in line with Hezbollah and Iranian agenda.
It is interesting to note that Israeli military was conducting its latest war games with a scenario to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon. This for sure became a strategic objective for Israel particularly with the ascent of Iran in the region. However, Hezbollah’s actions (either deliberately or not) forced the timing of the operation. It is hard to decipher if Hezbollah did that on purpose to drag Israel in a battle at its own timing. There is evidence to the contrary. In the first few hours of the Israeli assault, Hezbollah was attacked with low-flying Israeli helicopters and appeared to be paralyzed or unable to respond to the Israeli assault. Hezbollah for sure had anti-aircraft missiles capable of attacking those low flying helicopters particularly those that attacked Beirut airport. One can argue only that Hezbollah was keen on putting its arms away from Beirut for internal political reasons. If Hezbollah were expecting such a broad Israeli assault, it would have moved its arsenal into Beirut itself. Some commentators argued that the Israeli assault on Beirut’s southern suburb (Al-Dahiya) -- which yielded nothing because all of Hezbollah’s leaders went quickly into hiding -- shows the degree of readiness of Hezbollah that is indicative of its plot to trap the Israeli. I disagree with that. Hezbollah always expected an Israeli assault on its own assets. The continuous bombing of Al-Manar TV shows the degree of readiness that Hezbollah had and the level of planning it took upon itself to survive. In general, Hezbollah survived when the attack was directed at its own assets. The Beirut airport incident and the lack of Hezbollah readiness there shows that Hezbollah didn’t really anticipate a wider conflict with Israel and that its plans called for maintaining its weaponry outside Beirut itself to keep the internal peace in Lebanon.
Iran and Hezbollah of course were viewing the kidnapping as another step in bloodying Israel’s nose. Iran would win whether Israel responds (knowing that Hezbollah is ready) or not (which would be further humiliation). In the same way that Israel thinks, Iran also thinks that its best way to achieve a deal with the West and normalizing its life will be at the expense of the Israelis and that the Middle East cannot take the two of them together.
Some commentators argued that Iran timed the attack to detract from the UN debate over its nuclear program and it particularly picked up this fight knowing that it can only win. Later on, the Americans used this argument to bolster their position and to convince Arab leaders to support the Israeli offensive. This could be true. It is hard to separate the short-term motives such as this one from the long-term Iranian agenda or from the Iranians belief system. Iran benefits from the distraction for sure. Iran also does benefit from the long-term bloodying of the Israeli army. Iran and Hezbollah also hold strong beliefs that they have a mission from God to humiliate and destroy Israel. These beliefs are essential for their very survival.
All of these factors are inter-mixed and hard to separate. To summarize: (1) Although evidence indicates that Hezbollah didn’t expect such a broad Israeli attack, nevertheless it was prepared for an attack of some sort on its assets. As a matter of fact, it was always readying for such an attack. It could very well be an Iranian tactic to stall a UN debate on its nuclear program. (2) Hezbollah could genuinely be doing the kidnapping to bolster Hamas out of its own religious convictions. (3) Hezbollah and Iran both have a long-term goal of bloodying Israel. In my opinion, all of these factors could have contributed to Hezbollah’s actions.
In the same manner that it is difficult at the moment to nail one specific factor as contributing to Hezbollah’s action and it is likely all of these factors combined, it is hard on the Israeli side too to separate strategic objectives from short-term goals. Israel strategically has been planning to attack Hezbollah and its army war games were all centered around that. Later we will discuss why that is a strategic objective for Israel. Later on, Hasan Nasrallah will use that fact to show that Israel would have attacked Lebanon any way and it was just a matter of timing. That is probably true. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the circumstances and the short-term events in deciding the course of history. Again, even Israel needs a causus belli to attack someone. We all should remember that even under Sharon in 1982 when everybody knew that Israel was keen on invading Lebanon, Israel waited until its ambassador in London was hit to use that as a causus belli and invade Lebanon.
Therefore, with the kidnapping of two more soldiers, the stakes become all of sudden very high for Israel.
1- It is engaged in a strategic battle with Iran in the Middle East and it is a battle it cannot afford to lose.
2- It needs to prove to itself and the world that it didn’t lose its capabilities and that even though all of its historical leadership (founding fathers) are gone, it still has capable leaders.
3- The prime minister of Israel (who lacks any credentials except for being the shadow man to Israel’s last “king”) wants to prove himself to himself, to his family, and to his people.
The Israeli Flip-Flop
The Israeli cabinet convenes and authorizes the Israeli army to start an operation to achieve the strategic objectives of restoring Israel’s stature in the region. The Israeli leadership made one big crucial mistakes though. It never spelled to its army how a strategic objective that is as fluid as restoring stature could be achieved. One cannot dispute that Israel needed to achieve that objective. However, the objectives lacked operational definition and clarity. What do you exactly do to achieve that? This is evident in the ever-changing Israeli objectives during the 25 days so far of the war. For example,
1- Israel started by saying it wants to wipe out Hezbollah from Lebanon. Israel is the first one to know that to be impossible unless Israel is ready to wipe out 20-30% of Lebanon’s residents.
2- Then came the release of the two captured Israeli soldiers arguing that bombing all Lebanon’s bridges is intended to prevent their smuggling outside Lebanon.
3- Then came the establishment of 3-4 km buffer zone. With rockets capable of 100 km range in Hezbollah arsenal, the Israeli objective seems to be trivial and with no real value on the ground.
4- Then came the war that is intended to disarm Hezbollah from its rocket launching capabilities into Israel, which was only a development during the war itself, and not an original objective prior to the war. Nobody spoke of Hezbollah rocket threat until after rockets started to rain on Israeli cities.
5- Then came the creation of a buffer zone until the arrival of NATO force that Tony Blair has suggested in order to save the Israelis after their original setbacks in the battlefield. The idea morphed into achieving by NATO politically what Israel couldn’t achieve militarily. Israel liked the idea of forming a force similar to the one in Afghanistan that goes house-to-house after Taliban fighters. In a similar manner, NATO will go in South Lebanon house-to-house in search for Hezbollah. Israel has never agreed to international forces on its borders however given its losses in the battlefield and its inability to achieve its strategic objective, the NATO force can be the best possible alternative. It is widely reported that Olmert resisted any international force at the beginning. Olmert wanted to be like every great Israeli prime minister who refused international forces at Israel’s borders. Olmert himself went on TV to refuse such a force. Livni argued with him not to refuse something you may need eventually. Olmert toned down his voice and eventually the NATO force became the Israeli army battle objective! This later became UN force – which is even worse in the Israeli dictionary.
6- Then came the reprisal in and by itself as a battle objective. Olmert stood to declare victory to his army generals saying that: “from now on every country in the region knows that if it allows attacks on Israel from its territory, that country and its inhabitants will suffer the consequences.” Olmert was essentially addressing his army that the reprisal attacks on Lebanon’s infrastructure is an enough deterrent. This objective didn’t make sense even to his own army. Same day, Hezbollah rockets were raining on Israel. His army officers left the meeting with one of them saying: “it seems that the prime minister sees a different war than the one we see.” Besides, pictures of destruction are so widely spread in the region now that they don’t move the Arab population, not speak of deterring them.
7- Finally came the objective of punishing those specific individuals who captured the two Israeli soldiers. On August 6, Israel apparently coincidentally captured a Hezbollah fighter who was one of those engaging in the operation that led to capturing the two Israeli soldiers. This makes the whole affair a police operation rather than a military one. Besides, this cheap victory did not convince anybody that Israel was able to achieve any of its objectives. The press circulation of that particular news disappeared soon after.
The absence of specific operational directives given to the Israeli army and the constant change of objectives has led to chaotic scenes. The shaken political leadership issues what can only be described as an ultimatum to the Israeli army to “prove itself and show success.” The army privately accuses the civilian leadership of lacking guts. The prime minister friends in the Israeli media rush to help him and try to convince a wary Israeli public that they are winning the war. It gets so funny when an Israeli journalist writes, “Israel is finally learning how to live in the Middle East.” He claims that “as the Egyptians did in 1973 to claim they won even though they were defeated. Israel is finally learning that it can win the war through propaganda.” The Israeli propaganda machine is currently trying to convince itself, the region, and the world at large that it is winning the war but facts on the ground are undeniable:
1- Israel still suffers losses.
2- Hezbollah rockets still rain on Israeli cities and threatening even more and deeper attacks.
3- Hezbollah is still engaging Israeli army on the borders with the famed Israeli army incapable of any significant penetration.
4- The West, particularly Britain is attempting to win a political victory for Israel by positioning NATO/UN in South Lebanon.
The War Begins
We will come back later to the Israeli failures. Let us now shift focus to the Arab and the American sides.
On the Arab side first. Israel, after the collapse of Egyptian-brokered negotiations on the release of Gilead Shalit, was able to instigate Egypt and in turn Saudi Arabia against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran as we discussed before. This added to the original mistrust that Egyptian and Saudi Arabian leadership has in Iran.
On the American side, there are as always elements in any US administration who are in full agreement, knowledge, and support of Israeli moves. Those elements can be in some cases the instigators of those moves although it is futile to separate them from Israel proper because the linkage in attitude and strategic objectives is integral. And as we discussed before, there are elements in any US administration who are not necessarily Arabists (or loyal to Arabs) but they essentially mistrust the Israelis although they keep that hidden for a variety of reasons.
It is widely believed that the US was told that Israel would eventually do something against Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the past year when Israel attacked Palestinian installations in Syria, the US secretly warned Israel not to widen the attacks on Syria. Although the subject of Syria has been debated for at least 2 years inside the Bush administration, there was no conclusion reached. At one point after the success of invading Iraq, the US believed it could topple the regime in Syria, take it away from Iran, and transform the whole region. That was in 2003.
Then with the Iraq chaos ensuing afterwards, the US believed that a policy of bullying Syria would work at least in convincing Syria to stop acting as a base for Iraqi insurgency. With the foolish Syrian mistake of entangling themselves in the assassination of Rafiq Al-Hariri, this led in 2005 to the US essentially taking Lebanon (or at least most of it) away from Syria. It is a fact also that Syria made horrible mistakes in its relation with Lebanon therefore exposing itself and Lebanon wide open to interference and tampering. This is a different and long subject about the sad state of intra-Arab relations, the turn of which will come later. Therefore, the Syrian leadership lost a strategic negotiating asset in its battle for survival. However, American ambitions ended there simply because (a) Hezbollah withstood the storm and (b) the US genuinely didn’t know what to do with Syria.
There is no real plan for Syria after Assad or Baath and all the discussed alternatives are worse than each other and even worse than the current situation:
1- A Sunni Muslim-brotherhood led Syria (even if temporarily aligned with the US) will be a triumphant for political Islam and a setback for American politics that can only accentuate the Iraqi debacle.
2- An alternative to Assad inside the ruling Baath/Alwaite complex will eventually fall under Iranian influence similar to the turn of events in Iraq.
3- There are no other credible alternatives to speak of inside Syria. The Syrian economy has relatively done well in the past few years, as it was successful in attracting Gulf Arab investment. Therefore, the typical educated and business class in major Syrian cities is generally satisfied with its economical conditions. Besides, this class is under constant government surveillance and has been unable to produce any alternative leadership except for the Muslim brotherhood option, which to the Americans is still a non-starter.
The Egyptians and Saudis had promised they’d work on the Syrians to convince them to be more cooperative with American objectives in Iraq. Although the Bush administration doesn’t generally believe in talks especially among Arab leaders, this is probably the only real alternatives at the moment.
Thus, the US doesn’t know yet what to do with Syria. Besides, Iran has signed a mutual defense agreement with Syria that is widely believed to have teeth. Iran views an aggression on Syria to be an attack on its position in the region. This mutual defense agreement is viewed by the Iranians as necessary in the case of Syria and not needed in the case of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is equipped and is capable of launching a guerilla campaign against Israel. The Syrian army – as a classical army -- is much more vulnerable to an Israeli attack. Such an annihilation of the Syrian army will easily enable Israel to achieve its objective of restoring its stature in the region. Therefore, Iran views an attack on Syria as a sure recipe to restore its archenemy’s position and therefore a major setback for its own stature. This explains why Iran announced that an attack on Syria would constitute an attack on Iran itself and that Iran will respond to it in force.
The American and the Iranian factors acted as a restraint on Israel attacking Syria – at least so far.
However, the US has no qualms about attacking Hezbollah. To a degree also the Iranians know that Hezbollah is capable of repelling such an attack and that it needs not involve itself in it militarily. If Hezbollah repels Israel on its own, this raises the stature of Iran even further – much better than Iran involving itself in a direct conflict with the Israelis at which time it becomes a premature win-all or lose-all battle. Iran in its view, can win big if Hezbollah wins and it only needs to reinforce the known facts that it backs Hezbollah and Hezbollah’s win is its own victory.
When the Americans were told of the Israeli intentions to attack Hezbollah, the US administration gave a green light to that on the hope that a crippled Hezbollah will entice the Iranians to be more cooperative and push the US agenda in the region further toward the Bush’s administration regional objectives of isolating Syria (until something is thought for it or enticing it to be fully cooperative as the Egyptians had promised).
Therefore, America had given the Israelis a green light to attack Hezbollah but a red light as far as Syria goes. It is believed tht this green light was given when Sharon visited the US last time and the green light was reiterated after Olmert visited the US right after assuming office. In parallel, Israeli war games all focused on operations intended to wipe out Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, the exact timing of the operation was left to the Israelis. There is a difference between agreeing on a general strategy and being complicit in a specific operation. For sure, the Bush administration has to approve a policy of attacking Hezbollah, but this is a matter of strategy and not a matter of approving specific operations.
When Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldier, Israel decided that this event exceeded its tolerance and it had got to act. Hadley and Rice were informed that Israel would launch a major strike on Lebanon to wipe out Hezbollah. Israel’s real objective was restoring its stature. Of course, Israel cannot tell its real objective to the Americans. The Americans who had prior knowledge that such an operation would take place eventually agreed to it. President Bush was on his way from Germany to Russia to attend the G-8 summit. Bush wanted the summit to be a triumphal one. His French archenemy Jack Chirac is a lame duck now and Germany’s Angela Merkel is a right leaning Chancellor who is more conducive to American aggressive policies than her predecessor. Bush even goes on some major public relations campaign to get personal with world leaders. He gives a rub to Angela Merkel’s shoulder, and chat to other world leaders about how big their countries are. Bush wanted a touch-and-go conference in which he shows Putin that America is still liked and still had influence around the world. Bush thought that with Merkel prodded to his side together with Japan, Britain, and Canada strong support, Putin is only left with left-leaning Italy and lame duck France by his side. Bush had no intention of spoiling that show by a Middle Eastern war.
Bush was informed of the Israeli assault while in flight from Germany to Russia. All evidence indicate that President Bush was not happy to hear the turn of events. It for sure steals the show away from his G-8 agenda where he wanted to show his world leadership and get a strong condemnation of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Bush is known to hate surprises and this was certainly one.
Hadley and Rice brain-stormed that Israel’s assault fitted in America’s long-term objectives in the Middle East and if Israel delivers it will have wide ranging ramifications. Bush agreed to supporting the Israeli attack but he instructed his team to come up with ideas to avoid the G-8 becoming a platform to bash America and Israel. Hadley and Rice came up with a plan. The only way to avoid that is if:
1- Arab leaders voice that they blame Hezbollah for the escalation of violence.
2- Then, the rest of the world will have nothing to say – after all you cannot be more royal than the king himself. This certainly gives the President the victorious summit he was looking for.
On the Arab side first. Israel, after the collapse of Egyptian-brokered negotiations on the release of Gilead Shalit, was able to instigate Egypt and in turn Saudi Arabia against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran as we discussed before. This added to the original mistrust that Egyptian and Saudi Arabian leadership has in Iran.
On the American side, there are as always elements in any US administration who are in full agreement, knowledge, and support of Israeli moves. Those elements can be in some cases the instigators of those moves although it is futile to separate them from Israel proper because the linkage in attitude and strategic objectives is integral. And as we discussed before, there are elements in any US administration who are not necessarily Arabists (or loyal to Arabs) but they essentially mistrust the Israelis although they keep that hidden for a variety of reasons.
It is widely believed that the US was told that Israel would eventually do something against Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the past year when Israel attacked Palestinian installations in Syria, the US secretly warned Israel not to widen the attacks on Syria. Although the subject of Syria has been debated for at least 2 years inside the Bush administration, there was no conclusion reached. At one point after the success of invading Iraq, the US believed it could topple the regime in Syria, take it away from Iran, and transform the whole region. That was in 2003.
Then with the Iraq chaos ensuing afterwards, the US believed that a policy of bullying Syria would work at least in convincing Syria to stop acting as a base for Iraqi insurgency. With the foolish Syrian mistake of entangling themselves in the assassination of Rafiq Al-Hariri, this led in 2005 to the US essentially taking Lebanon (or at least most of it) away from Syria. It is a fact also that Syria made horrible mistakes in its relation with Lebanon therefore exposing itself and Lebanon wide open to interference and tampering. This is a different and long subject about the sad state of intra-Arab relations, the turn of which will come later. Therefore, the Syrian leadership lost a strategic negotiating asset in its battle for survival. However, American ambitions ended there simply because (a) Hezbollah withstood the storm and (b) the US genuinely didn’t know what to do with Syria.
There is no real plan for Syria after Assad or Baath and all the discussed alternatives are worse than each other and even worse than the current situation:
1- A Sunni Muslim-brotherhood led Syria (even if temporarily aligned with the US) will be a triumphant for political Islam and a setback for American politics that can only accentuate the Iraqi debacle.
2- An alternative to Assad inside the ruling Baath/Alwaite complex will eventually fall under Iranian influence similar to the turn of events in Iraq.
3- There are no other credible alternatives to speak of inside Syria. The Syrian economy has relatively done well in the past few years, as it was successful in attracting Gulf Arab investment. Therefore, the typical educated and business class in major Syrian cities is generally satisfied with its economical conditions. Besides, this class is under constant government surveillance and has been unable to produce any alternative leadership except for the Muslim brotherhood option, which to the Americans is still a non-starter.
The Egyptians and Saudis had promised they’d work on the Syrians to convince them to be more cooperative with American objectives in Iraq. Although the Bush administration doesn’t generally believe in talks especially among Arab leaders, this is probably the only real alternatives at the moment.
Thus, the US doesn’t know yet what to do with Syria. Besides, Iran has signed a mutual defense agreement with Syria that is widely believed to have teeth. Iran views an aggression on Syria to be an attack on its position in the region. This mutual defense agreement is viewed by the Iranians as necessary in the case of Syria and not needed in the case of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is equipped and is capable of launching a guerilla campaign against Israel. The Syrian army – as a classical army -- is much more vulnerable to an Israeli attack. Such an annihilation of the Syrian army will easily enable Israel to achieve its objective of restoring its stature in the region. Therefore, Iran views an attack on Syria as a sure recipe to restore its archenemy’s position and therefore a major setback for its own stature. This explains why Iran announced that an attack on Syria would constitute an attack on Iran itself and that Iran will respond to it in force.
The American and the Iranian factors acted as a restraint on Israel attacking Syria – at least so far.
However, the US has no qualms about attacking Hezbollah. To a degree also the Iranians know that Hezbollah is capable of repelling such an attack and that it needs not involve itself in it militarily. If Hezbollah repels Israel on its own, this raises the stature of Iran even further – much better than Iran involving itself in a direct conflict with the Israelis at which time it becomes a premature win-all or lose-all battle. Iran in its view, can win big if Hezbollah wins and it only needs to reinforce the known facts that it backs Hezbollah and Hezbollah’s win is its own victory.
When the Americans were told of the Israeli intentions to attack Hezbollah, the US administration gave a green light to that on the hope that a crippled Hezbollah will entice the Iranians to be more cooperative and push the US agenda in the region further toward the Bush’s administration regional objectives of isolating Syria (until something is thought for it or enticing it to be fully cooperative as the Egyptians had promised).
Therefore, America had given the Israelis a green light to attack Hezbollah but a red light as far as Syria goes. It is believed tht this green light was given when Sharon visited the US last time and the green light was reiterated after Olmert visited the US right after assuming office. In parallel, Israeli war games all focused on operations intended to wipe out Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, the exact timing of the operation was left to the Israelis. There is a difference between agreeing on a general strategy and being complicit in a specific operation. For sure, the Bush administration has to approve a policy of attacking Hezbollah, but this is a matter of strategy and not a matter of approving specific operations.
When Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldier, Israel decided that this event exceeded its tolerance and it had got to act. Hadley and Rice were informed that Israel would launch a major strike on Lebanon to wipe out Hezbollah. Israel’s real objective was restoring its stature. Of course, Israel cannot tell its real objective to the Americans. The Americans who had prior knowledge that such an operation would take place eventually agreed to it. President Bush was on his way from Germany to Russia to attend the G-8 summit. Bush wanted the summit to be a triumphal one. His French archenemy Jack Chirac is a lame duck now and Germany’s Angela Merkel is a right leaning Chancellor who is more conducive to American aggressive policies than her predecessor. Bush even goes on some major public relations campaign to get personal with world leaders. He gives a rub to Angela Merkel’s shoulder, and chat to other world leaders about how big their countries are. Bush wanted a touch-and-go conference in which he shows Putin that America is still liked and still had influence around the world. Bush thought that with Merkel prodded to his side together with Japan, Britain, and Canada strong support, Putin is only left with left-leaning Italy and lame duck France by his side. Bush had no intention of spoiling that show by a Middle Eastern war.
Bush was informed of the Israeli assault while in flight from Germany to Russia. All evidence indicate that President Bush was not happy to hear the turn of events. It for sure steals the show away from his G-8 agenda where he wanted to show his world leadership and get a strong condemnation of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Bush is known to hate surprises and this was certainly one.
Hadley and Rice brain-stormed that Israel’s assault fitted in America’s long-term objectives in the Middle East and if Israel delivers it will have wide ranging ramifications. Bush agreed to supporting the Israeli attack but he instructed his team to come up with ideas to avoid the G-8 becoming a platform to bash America and Israel. Hadley and Rice came up with a plan. The only way to avoid that is if:
1- Arab leaders voice that they blame Hezbollah for the escalation of violence.
2- Then, the rest of the world will have nothing to say – after all you cannot be more royal than the king himself. This certainly gives the President the victorious summit he was looking for.
Speaking to the press after the conflict started, President Mubarak said Egypt started, immediately after the capture of the Israeli soldier in Gaza, contacts with Palestinians and Israelis to urge them to avoid taking any measure and to wait until Cairo intervened to settle the problem. Egypt was so close to settling the problem of the abducted Israeli soldier in Gaza, he added. Contacts involved Hamas, which promised implementation, but some parties intervened and impeded the matters, he said. This led to Israel striking Gaza until the second problem concerning Hizbollah emerged, further complicating the situation, he added. The Lebanese government must exercise its control over all its lands and should any party carry out any act, it must consult with the state to avoid dragging it into the matter he said. It should inform the state of all developments so that it could take the necessary precautions, he said. On reports of having other countries dragged into the conflict, Mubarak said one must resort to wise judgment to transcend the current difficult situation. He warned that embracing any rash notions could implicate the entire region in the quagmire. The President called on advocates of activating a pan-Arab defence pact to read the agreement carefully, as the issue was not as simple as they believed, he added. "Under the pact, continued consultation must be maintained at the level of foreign ministers on arriving at a peaceful solution.
Onboard the plane, Bush started with calling President Mubarak, King Abdullah of Jordan, and king Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Prior to the call, Bush rehearsed the line. Rice was on the other line listening over to the conversations. Bush started by saying that the US condemns Hezbollah attacks and that it is unprovoked attack that threatens to escalate the situation in the whole region. He reminded Mubarak that this came at a time when everybody though an Egyptian-brokered deal for Gilead Shalit was imminent. Bush concluded that if it was not for the Iranians and that Hezbollah’s interference, every thing would have clamed down back and that this must be an Iranian plot to set the region aflame. Mubarak agreed and Rice gives her boss a thump up. The discussion went in a similar manner with the other Arab leaders.
Bush landed in Russia with his line rehearsed very well and now he got to face the other G-8 leaders with the same line that Hezbollah is to blame and if only they get Syria to stop Hezbollah from attacking Israel, then the whole thing will stop. Either it was a slip or Bush was advised to avoid mentioning Iran since this will give Iran too much credit in the region unnecessarily. If only Syria is mentioned, it puts even more pressure on Syria. Syria is the weaker link in the chain and if it felt implicated or threatened, its knees may shiver and may drop ripe by itself. Therefore, Iran gets dropped from Bush’s line when he arrived in Russia. The new line was used repeatedly with all the leaders he met and with the press. The world got to hear that same exact line when Bush spoke to an “erroneously” open microphones.
Let us focus on the open microphone incident for a second. It is not true that the Americans were surprised at the open microphone episode. Few months ago, the Russians “had” an open microphone in a discussion between Sergei Lavrov and Rice. The discussion showed that Ivanov was holding a tough line with the visiting American and that Russia is increasingly a capable foe to the Americans. This is part of Putin’s policy to restore Russian world influence. The American expected a similar episode. It gets even worse. During the summit, there was a constantly flying balloon over the palace where the Americans were staying. This was there to pick up American conversations in case the Americans wanted to go to the open gardens and discuss any secret matters. The Americans therefore transported the President armored car to Russia and used it whenever they wanted to hold secret discussions. The Americans were prevented from sweeping the palace grounds for any bugs. It is hard to believe that the Americans went to Russia and were not expecting another “open microphone” episode.
In Preparation for the G-8 Summit, Lavrov and Rice Met When An "Open Microphone" Revealed a Testy Exchange Between the Two In Which Lavrov Hold A Tough Line. Few Months Later, Another "Open Microphone" Revealed An Exchange Between Bush and Blair. Either Russia Needs Some Good Sound Engineers or It Is On Purpose. I Have To Vote for the 2nd.
Bush hated the whole affair so he wanted it to be over soon. He even avoided the customary press conference before leaving the summit and instead flew directly back home. The Russians wanted to press conference to ask Bush all the tough questions. They didn’t get the opportunity.
Bush went back to Washington generally satisfied with the turn of events except for one single annoyance, which was Kofi Anan. The UN diplomat viewed the Israeli assault on Lebanon as a threat to the efforts that Teri Rod Larsen was attempting to make in pinpointing those who killed Hariri and building a Lebanese consensus to neutralize Hezbollah peacefully. Anan’s viewed the Israeli assault’s outcome as a set back to that process. Kofi Anan started a campaign to convince world leaders that the attacks must be stopped and the status quo ante be restored. Bush hated that and therefore he bashed Anan while talking to Blair on the open microphone.
Bush wanted to get cozy with world leaders at the G-8 summit. He intended it to be a show of America restoring back its friends in the world under his watch. He may have gone too far in that respect. In the picture, Bush is seen given a shoulder rub to the unspuspecting Merkel...a step that backfired in the German press. Honestly this only shows poor judgment on Bush's side and his aides.
During the conference, Germany and Japan were disinterested in the whole affair and rather wanted to focus on economic matters – particularly the massive US trade imbalance. Canada didn’t want a repeat of its stance against the US during the invasion of Iraq. Italy has a fractious coalition and cannot afford to think beyond its borders. Britain and France had its own agenda, which we will come to later. Russia was upset and wanted to help Kofi but didn’t find an Arab position that can give it any ammunition. Kofi Annan’s appeals fell on deaf ears generally. Bush went home relaxed. Secretary Rice announced that there could only be cease-fire if the causes of the conflict are corrected and the conditions for a lasting peace are put in place – a code word for allowing Israel to continue tightening the noose on Hezbollah for as long as it might take.
Let us get back to Washington now to analyze the position of various American government agencies. For years, CIA didn’t hide its animosity toward Hezbollah. CIA and FBI have both tracked Hezbollah activity particularly in Canada and Africa where a large and wealthy Lebanese Shiite community plays a role in financing and equipping Hezbollah. Hezbollah had tried to smuggle cigarettes across US-Canadian boarders and FBI was successful at stopping the attempt. The attempt was significant since it was performed across Indian tribes territory striding both Canadian and American boarders. Although that is a common smuggling route, such an attempt would require specific knowledge of local terrain. This was not the act of a foreigner trying to smuggle a pack of cigarette through customs but rather the attempt of a highly trained group that is capable of infiltrating the locals. This attempt rang all kinds of alarm bells in the United States regarding the increasing sophistication of Hezbollah. It is easy to predict that American intelligence services were paying close attention to any new weaponry being introduced in the battlefield by Hezbollah.
Before launching the attack, Israel (according to news reports) notified the United States, Egypt, and Jordan that it will have to respond with force to the kidnapping of its soldiers and that the operation will widen to clean up Hezbollah at least from Southern Lebanon. Egyptian intelligence head Omar Sullieman advised the Israelis to avoid the mistakes of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by limiting the scope inside the South and by avoiding occupation of large swaths of lands. Mubarak later announced that he advised the Israelis to avoid any troop landing in Beirut.
It is believed that the American intelligence advised the Israelis to do the same and avoid making it a large-scale invasion of Lebanon. This was another resounding of 1982 when the late Kamal Hassan Ali (then defense minister of Egypt) warned the Israelis from any large-scale invasion of Lebanon.
The Israelis this time had their own reasons to be wary of Lebanon. Lebanon has a very sour connotation in the Israeli psyche that although it being the weakest Arab country and the most cosmopolitan, Lebanon is the only one to drive Israel out only by use of force. Israel was having its own doubts about a large-scale operation and the advise of Egypt and others could only reinforce Israel’s own doubts. There are other personal factors that made the Israelis proceed even more cautiously. The first of them is that the Israeli Chief of staff is an air force general who subscribed to the American view that air power is enough to win the war. Therefore, Israel at least in the initial phases of the war had concentrated heavily on the use of air power believing that they can wipe out Hezbollah that way. Even more so, that belief led to careless advancing of Israeli soldier toward Hezbollah strongholds on the premise that the air power was enough. This led to major Israeli surprises. Another one is that General Udi Adam who heads the Northern Israeli front and a veteran of Lebanon-Israeli war has personal bad memories of Lebanon and of Hezbollah fighting capacity. Therefore, he was more than happy to listen to his commander (Israel’s chief of staff) and rely mostly on an air campaign with limited ground assaults. All of these factors acted together to make the Israelis proceed with caution, with reliance on airpower, and with limited goals on the ground.
Moving back to the United States, most politicians in the Bush administration were comfortable that Israel will be able to deal a major blow to Hezbollah. The Bush administration once again chose to ignore intelligence reports that Hezbollah has amassed a large weapon stockpile that is not only massive but is sophisticated too. There was rejuvenation in some circles of the Bush administration on the belief that a major Israeli victory will re-invigorate their Middle East agenda. Several people from the White House spoke to the press on condition not to be named, that they were ecstatic at the prospect of this war and that they view it as a game-changer.
In Europe, the Brits, the French, and the Russians had the clearest view of what was going on. All the other major players had their vision blurred:
1- Germans and Japanese were disinterested in any foreign policy indulgence. Their primary focus was on economical matters. They also didn’t see an incentive to take a position that could ultimately sour their relations with the US or with Iran, or with the Arabs, or with the Russians. Essentially taking a position on this matter will sour the relation with somebody and Germany and Japan didn’t want that. They both decided to stay on the fence and monitor the development – rejecting nicely any calls for intervention. Later Angela Merkel under intense pressure from the US, and other European allies had to say that she thinks the deployment of German troops to help out is an interesting idea but she stopped short of any follow-ups and tried to escape any attention from that point onward. There were attempts early on by Arab and European politicians to get the Germans to broker a deal for an exchange of prisoners similar to the one they brokered in 2000. Germany nicely said that it is not in a position to do so again because the climate is not conducive to that.
2- US and Bush administration had their eyes blurred by the entangling they have in Iraq and the prospect of the Lebanon campaign to help them get out of the swamp. Therefore, they supported it at the onset on the hope. Their vision also was blurred unfortunately by their very own ideology.
3- Arabs were ticked off by Iran and Hezbollah due to the botched Egyptian attempt to broker a deal on Shalit’s release.
UK, France, and Russia had all vested interests and clear vision. Initial assessment from intelligence services in all 3 capitals was that Israel is gambling with significant ramifications on the whole region. Blair and Chirac talked on the subject immediately after Israel started its offensive. They shared their assessment that the situation in the Middle East could not take more violence and that Israel is gambling in a major way. France and Ireland (and subsequently all of Europe) have also been monitoring through UNIFL the increased Hezbollah capabilities in Southern Lebanon. All intelligence reports from Lebanon indicated that Hezbollah has access to lethal weapons and that achieving Israeli objectives of wiping out Hezbollah will essentially mean wiping out Lebanon itself – which all 3 capitals particularly the French couldn’t tolerate. UK and France agreed that the only way out is the deployment of NATO force in Southern Lebanon with a mandate to stop and may even eventually go all the way to wiping out Hezbollah (depending on course of Lebanon’s internal politics). The deployment of such a force will achieve many objectives in France and UK’s perspective:
1- Influence on Lebanese politics that may eventually lead to neutralization of Hezbollah.
2- Secure Israeli boarders and elimination of Hezbollah threat.
The model that was envisioned is a la Bosnia in which the overwhelming firepower of NATO is enough to deter everybody on all sides. Chirac -- who has been shut off American graces since the Iraqi war dispute -- agreed with Blair that it is Blair who should broach the subject with Bush during the G-8 summit. Putin liked the idea of troop deployment but he wanted it to be UN rather than an International force. He saw that as a potential way for Russia to get back to the Middle East.
Blair broached the subject with Bush during the G-8 summit. Bush didn’t even reply to the idea. Instead, Bush gave Blair the same answer he discussed with Rice and Hadley – that Syria needs to stop Hezbollah from doing this “shit.” We all heard it in the open microphone incident.
With Germany absent from the scene, Russia steps in dramatically. Russia always wanted an “in” to the Middle East, which in case it happens will be viewed as a major setback for American monopoly on the region. Russia activates its channels with Iran. At one point, Putin was speaking to Ahemdi Nijad on a daily basis. The main Russian play was to broker an exchange of prisoners between Hezbollah and Israel and the deployment of UN forces (instead of NATO) in Lebanon. By nature of events, Russia figured out that in order to get back to the Middle East it has to take a position that is opposite the American one and closer to the Europeans.
After a flurry of diplomatic activities, the US as we saw before was able to put a damper on the G-8 summit on the expectation that it will be over in few days, Israel will come victorious, and the game will be changed again.
The Rome Conference
In the background however, Lebanese politicians started to speak of an Israeli offensive that far exceeded what the Egyptians spoke of. The operation involved destroying of bridges and complete blocks in Beirut itself. Fouad Al-Saniora has to be credited of being able to single-handedly rally the Europeans and Arabs to come and save Lebanon. Bush and Rice agreed grudgingly to the Rome conference on the assumption that it can vent some steam on the international arena and that it can also be stalled to buy time for the Israelis. The American plan going into the Rome conference was to:
1- Limit exposure: The conference has to be short and doesn’t give the impression of negotiating.
2- Rice will not visit Arab countries so as not to give the impression of mediation. Besides, many in the Bush administration felt that Arab capitals did what US originally wanted and there was not much more they have to offer. The only thing they could now get from Arab capital is a bill (cease fire) that they don’t want to pay.
3- Stick to the position that there can only be a lasting peace and that the conditions that created the current situation must be changed (namely wiping out Hezbollah).
The Rome conference got extremely emotional at points. Rice was completely isolated. Kofi Anan was pissed off because of the Israeli bombing of UNIFIL that he described as deliberate (with evidence supporting that claim). Rice felt that the only thing she wants is to get back home. Every single leader who attended the conference was against the US. The UNIFIL bombing complicated the matter dramatically for Rice. Anan gave Rice evidence that showed that UNIFIL officers were calling IDF every hour to warn them that the shelling keeps getting closer to the UN position. UN also passed to Israel exact coordinates of the UN posts. Anan told Rice that there was no way this couldn’t be a deliberate attack aimed at showing that the UN is helpless and to make sure that the final solution doesn’t include UN but includes NATO instead. Under intense pressure, Rice offered a diplomatic language compromise that she wants an immediate cease fire as long as it guarantees a permanent solution. Everybody attending the conference understood that she is just buying time for the Israelis.
Rice was much more stressed during the Rome conference than usual. Rice who is a tough woman probably couldn't take the stress coming from multiple directions - most difficult of them coming from Dick Cheney himself.
It is important to note that during and after the Rome conference, Rice appeared to be more stressed than usual. Press cameras captured that and aired it all over the world. This is interesting because Rice is made of a tough material and she was for sure subject to much more emotional situations than what can ever possibly happen in the Rome conference. For example she went to Iraq where there are more casualties every day than all the casualties in Lebanon. She was also national security advisor during 9/11 and during the Iraq invasion where conversations with world leaders were even nastier and the pressure internally in the US was worse. She handled herself very well in all these situations. What got Rice to be stressed out and obviously nervous and shaken can be explained not by what she was subjected to from her peers but what was happening internally in her team. Not trusting Rice to go by herself and not trusting her state department team, Dick Cheney took the unusual step of sending Eliot Abrahams with her to the conference. State department diplomats most likely didn’t like that but for sure they were instructed that this was coming directly from the White House. Rice was under pressure from 3 directions: her staff in the state department, Dick Cheney and his minders in Rome, and from the world leaders that she was meeting with. The pressure apparently was too much for her and it showed on all cameras.
Israeli Setbacks
Back on the battleground, it started after few days to emerge that Israel was facing major difficulty. The turning point was destroying an Israeli ship off the Lebanese coast and the constant bleeding in men and equipment that Israel kept suffering.
Israeli Tanks Burning in Southern Lebanon. August 2006.
There are several factors for that to happen:
1- As we talked, Hezbollah had access to sophisticated weaponry developed or rigged by the Iranians.
2- The Israeli leadership indecisiveness, which is propelled largely by the Lebanon-complex in the Israeli psyche and by that leadership weaknesses as well.
3- As we talked before, the Israeli army is not itself any more. I looked at reports from the battlefield speaking of Israeli soldiers who take weekends to go back to their hometowns inside Israel and resume the battle during weekdays! This is a recipe for a spoiled army and is unimaginable for an army that is fighting for its survival. This a far cry from the Israeli founding fathers and how they fought their battles.
4- Finally, the Israeli battle plan itself was severely flawed. Israel relied on air power followed by mopping operations. In those mopping operations a group of soldiers go house to house to search for Hezbollah fighters who are presumably dead from the air assault. These mopping operations extended the Israeli infantry and made them extremely vulnerable. These operations also included use of few tanks and few armored vehicles to support the infantry. This is counter to all military theories about usage of tanks. As Lidell Hart says tanks has to be used together in a concentrated effort that attacks the enemy in the weakest point to maximize damage. Tanks are worst used when they are spread all over. The lessons Israel learnt from years of combating the Palestinian Intifida and using tanks in policing operations and perhaps their arrogance too led them to violate military theories – which proved disastrous later on.
1- As we talked, Hezbollah had access to sophisticated weaponry developed or rigged by the Iranians.
2- The Israeli leadership indecisiveness, which is propelled largely by the Lebanon-complex in the Israeli psyche and by that leadership weaknesses as well.
3- As we talked before, the Israeli army is not itself any more. I looked at reports from the battlefield speaking of Israeli soldiers who take weekends to go back to their hometowns inside Israel and resume the battle during weekdays! This is a recipe for a spoiled army and is unimaginable for an army that is fighting for its survival. This a far cry from the Israeli founding fathers and how they fought their battles.
4- Finally, the Israeli battle plan itself was severely flawed. Israel relied on air power followed by mopping operations. In those mopping operations a group of soldiers go house to house to search for Hezbollah fighters who are presumably dead from the air assault. These mopping operations extended the Israeli infantry and made them extremely vulnerable. These operations also included use of few tanks and few armored vehicles to support the infantry. This is counter to all military theories about usage of tanks. As Lidell Hart says tanks has to be used together in a concentrated effort that attacks the enemy in the weakest point to maximize damage. Tanks are worst used when they are spread all over. The lessons Israel learnt from years of combating the Palestinian Intifida and using tanks in policing operations and perhaps their arrogance too led them to violate military theories – which proved disastrous later on.
Turning of Positions
With the continuous deterioration in the Israeli position on the war front, the position of most players started taking dramatic turns. Let take the actors one by one.
The US army and intelligence services most likely took notice of the Iranian weaponry on the ground. Israelis told their US counterparts that laser guided rifles, night vision goggles, and laser-guided anti-tank missiles capable of penetrating the Merkava (top of the line Israeli battle tank) were all seen on the battlefield and that Hezbollah was using them with extreme efficacy. Even worse, Israeli air force complained that trenches built by Hezbollah were essentially impervious to Israelis air attacks. After each round of bombardment, Hezbollah fighters emerged unscathed. US military intelligence assessment for sure turned dire. Most likely the assessment now is an invasion of Iran under those conditions becomes virtual impossibility.
Israelis asked for heavier bombs of the bunker-buster class. President Bush approved the shipment immediately and asked his aides to find a way of sending it. The found a clause in the 2007 military aid bill that allows expedited shipment within the same fiscal year without congress approval. The bombs were airlifted through a military base in Scotland. The shipment was rushed to the extent of not even thinking about getting permission from the British authorities. Britain later complained to no effect. The bombs arrived but apparently again to no effect. The military assessment for sure grew even direr.
With the growing unease about the military situation in Lebanon, the Bush administration shifted into high gear trying to salvage the Israelis politically. The target now became to achieve politically what the Israelis have been unable to achieve militarily. France and Britain came in handy for that. The US --which initially was lukewarm to any international force deployment -- started to talk about the need for a UN resolution. Blair advised that French and American diplomats should get into negotiations on a proposed UN resolution. Blair’s idea was that the Arabs especially Lebanese will trust a resolution that has French seal on it. The Russians were kept aware of the negotiations. The Russians wanted UN peacekeeping force and not NATO. The talk of NATO was dropped on Russian objections. The Israelis objected to that but were subsequently told that in absence of achievements on the ground, this will be a small concession that they have to make. Ehud Olmert accepted that grudgingly knowing this is the best option he has.
Back in Israel, Ehud Olmert’s plan was to portrait the war as a victory at least for domestic consumption. This was to become the worst acting performance in the whole episode. What was possible in the 70s is impossible now in today's age of the Internet and blogging. The Israeli public became well aware of the true situation on the ground despite all the censorship. On one day, his army generals told him that they believe they attacked a major cache of Hezbollah rockets. They argued to Olmert that this explained the sudden decline in Hezbollah rockets falling on Israel. Olmert rushed to speak to his nation that the risk of Hezbollah had been neutralized and that Israel was winning the war. One army officer came out of the meeting telling a friend from the press: “apparently the prime minister is talking about another war here.” The next morning, Hezbollah was raining Haifa with rockets. Olmert’s propaganda plan falters. The Israeli public started taking notice that they were losing the war or at the very least not winning.
With failure looming on the horizon, infighting inside the Israeli government started. The cabinet issues a rare warning to the army to “start producing results soon.” This unusual fracture between an Israeli cabinet and the army made the Israeli public even more nervous.
Back in New York, negotiations started on a UN resolution. The Americans came out with the idea that the situation called for two resolutions. The first of the two should call for immediate cessation of hostilities (a term loaded with mines as we shall discover). The other (issued under Chapter 7 of the UN charter) calling for the mandatory deployment of UN troops in Lebanon. The idea is filled with minefields:
1- Cessation of hostilities means that Hezbollah has to stop its attacks, while Israel, which is responding in defensive measures is still free to act.
2- While the cessation of hostilities resolution is not mandatory, the deployment of UN troops is mandatory under chapter 7 (which means that the resolution has to be by carried by all means including the use of force). Arabs are now well aware of Chapter 7. An average Arab now is well versed in the UN charter at least enough to qualify to become an international lawyer.
3- Even more so, the second mandatory resolution calls for South Lebanon to be a zone free of any Hezbollah fighters.
4- Worst of all from Arab perspective, the resolution calls for immediate release of Israeli prisoners but not of Lebanese ones.
The French communicates the resolution to major Arab capitals. Surprisingly at first Arab capitals express no opinion about the resolution. It is only Beirut which calls accepting that the resolution to be suicidal for Lebanon. Al-Saniora now fuming about the disastrous implications for Lebanon, calls for a meeting of the Arab foreign ministers in Beirut. The Israeli air assault on Lebanon infrastructure intensified to pressure Lebanon into accepting a ceasefire under any conditions. In a rare show of a spinal chord, Arab foreign ministers gathered in Beirut and heard Al-Saniora pleading for help. Al-Saniora told his visitors that David Welch and the French are asking Lebanon to accept the resolution as is. Al-Saniora warned that accepting such a resolution would mean the end of Lebanon as they know it and that another civil war will be on the horizon. Al-Saniora pleaded to his Arab visitors that Lebanon would end like Afghanistan: a country under patronage of foreign powers with Hezbollah and Iran itself fighting them inside Lebanon. He warned that if Lebanon falls that way, the rest of the Arab world would collapse. The Arab foreign ministers decide to send a delegation to New York to actively participate in forming the UN resolution. The Arab ministers decide to send those with the strongest possible ties to the US but still with a tinge of oil enough to send the right message. The delegate includes Amr Moussa, Qatari and Emerati foreign ministers.
France was informed of the Arab rejection of the current resolution. The French were surprised at the sudden resurgence in the Arab position. However, they were more than happy to tell the Americans that the resolution need to be re-negotiated to reflect Arab demands. The Russians, who have been kept in the loop—warned that a resolution that doesn’t satisfy minimum Lebanese demands would be vetoed. John Bolton aware that his boss didn’t want another showdown a la the Iraq debacle proceeded to re-negotiate with the French.
Another story I am unable to substantiate but appears believable goes as follows: At noon the day before Arab foreign ministers met in Beirut, Ehud Olmert’s office called the Egyptian presidency and asked for a special envoy to be received in Egypt as soon as possible. The presidency told him that the envoy would be welcome but that the president was on vacation in Borg Al-Arab. It turned out that the envoy was immediately ready to fly directly on a private jet to land at Borg Al-Arab. The president met with the envoy that immediately turned back to the airport to fly back to Israel. The envoy communicated to the president that if Israel was allowed to look as a loser, Iran will control the Middle East. The envoy warned that if the UN resolution were not accepted as is, the Israeli public would take note of Israel’s losses and will shift its mood to the right where Likud will once again win and Netanyahu will come to power. Israel is told that the public opinion in the Arab street is completely against it and that any moves that will given the semblance of giving concessions to Israel will alienate the Arab public opinion and will destabilize Arab countries. At the time, Egyptian demonstration went carrying portraits of Hasan Nasrallah. Joke on the Cairo streets was that if Hasan Nasrallah nominates himself for president of Egypt, he’d win. Mubarak took note of all of that. He went on live TV to address his nation regarding Egypt’s full support to Lebanon. Later on, his wife Suzanne did the same.
The Conflict Continues and the Last Attempt
Frustrated and unable to advance its agenda, Israeli cabinet voted to replace Udi Adam (who has been leading the military campaign) and sent instead the assistant chief of staff. Remarkably, even the Americans started rebuffing the Israelis for their failure. The new general arrived on the spot and saw the chaos on the battlefront. He started organizing his army into 3 prongs so as to lead a classical textbook armored campaign. He also asked the cabinet to approve a widening of the campaign. The idea was to replace the policing activities (which have been going on so far) with a major 3-pronged attack that avoids fighting Hezbollah directly but instead goes directly to penetrating deep inside Lebanon. The new general wanted to repeat what Sharon did in 1973 in which pictures of Israeli soldiers on the canal (Litani this time) will be enough to convince the world that Israel won. The attack goes on but again faces major resistance. The cabinet convenes again. In an emotional debate, Olmert told his ministers: “this is the only Israeli army we have. I don’t know of any other army.” Rice called Olmert and spoke to the cabinet during the meeting. She told them that the UN resolution would have to be modified to reflect Arab demands and that the US will do its best to minimize the effect on Israel. The cabinet understood the message that in the absence of victories on the ground, Israel was strangling itself and making its US ally vulnerable. Rice told Olmert that the only way to get the resolution through with minimal concessions is if Israel accepted it quickly so as to put Lebanon and Arabs in no position to ask for more. The Israeli cabinet authorizes the approval of the UN Security Council resolution.
Arab governments and Lebanon gave the nod ahead to the resolution. The resolution finally passes reflecting some of the Arab demands particularly the withdrawal of the Israeli army. Another important concession in the new resolution vs. the old is eliminating the reference to another resolution that mandates troop deployment under chapter 7. Only the Lebanese army will be in Southern Lebanon aided by an expanded UNIFIL. Hezbollah doesn’t mind that knowing real well that both UNIFIL and the Lebanese army cannot stop his presence in Southern Lebanon and that Hezbollah could resume fighting whenever the situation permits. Progress on the ground could also lend Hezbollah fighters to join the Lebanese army. The resolution although unfair from Hezbollah perspective (especially because it doesn’t address Shebaa farms and doesn’t ask for immediate release of Lebanese prisoners) is acceptable.
A poll in Israel shows that only 20% of the Israelis believe they won the 6th war. The stage is now wide open for the political infighting in Israel and the onslaught on Olmert and his team.
Arab governments and Lebanon gave the nod ahead to the resolution. The resolution finally passes reflecting some of the Arab demands particularly the withdrawal of the Israeli army. Another important concession in the new resolution vs. the old is eliminating the reference to another resolution that mandates troop deployment under chapter 7. Only the Lebanese army will be in Southern Lebanon aided by an expanded UNIFIL. Hezbollah doesn’t mind that knowing real well that both UNIFIL and the Lebanese army cannot stop his presence in Southern Lebanon and that Hezbollah could resume fighting whenever the situation permits. Progress on the ground could also lend Hezbollah fighters to join the Lebanese army. The resolution although unfair from Hezbollah perspective (especially because it doesn’t address Shebaa farms and doesn’t ask for immediate release of Lebanese prisoners) is acceptable.
A poll in Israel shows that only 20% of the Israelis believe they won the 6th war. The stage is now wide open for the political infighting in Israel and the onslaught on Olmert and his team.
What Is Next?
Historians will argue for a long-time about the significance of the sixth Arab-Israeli war. Some may put it as another nail in the Israeli coffin, or another pearl in a string of Israeli setbacks that started with 1973, followed by 1982 failing invasion of Lebanon, and ending with 2006. Others may view it as another Arab or Muslim victory hijacked by the political process and American interference to save its Israeli ally. Yet others will see it as the beginning of an eternal fight between the West and Islam. It is too soon to put the 6th war within such a long view of history. However, it is easier to make certain predictions about the future of the major actors.
The position of Iran in the Middle East has grown significantly. Iran now casts a long shadow over the whole region. It will be hard for any coming American president to ignore settling with Iran in a manner similar to settling with China after the Vietnam debacle. Iran now can deliver 50% of Iraq and at least 80% of Lebanon and Syria for America. Like China, a military solution to Iran is virtually impossible. All it takes is a generous settlement on the nuclear option and acceding of Iran to the WTO. This on the long run can even shift social and political norms in Iran and bring it closer to the West – similar to China. A coming US president will be hard pressed not to do so.
The path to that will not be straightforward. If war is impossible, the US will attempt to defeat Iran in other ways. As we all know, politics is a different way of waging war and war is just another way of waging politics. Subversive actions against Iran have already started. It is no secret that Qatar went to Pakistan to offer substantially discounted oil in exchange for Pakistan to abandon importing natural gas from Iran and to abort the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. The US offered India to abort the tripartite pipeline in exchange for giving India nuclear technology. India and Pakistan don’t want to close the Iranian option but the pipeline negotiations are stalled on a pricing dispute. Iran wants $7 for its gas while India wants to pay only less than $5. Qatar already increased its liquefied natural gas shipment to India to thwart the pipeline. India imports Qatari gas at $5, which is a discounted price compared to spot prices. Qatar views it as a business transaction. The US views it as politics. The war goes on by other means.
The position of Israel in the region as a main power has deteriorated sharply now. Israeli army for a whole month showed its inability to defeat a small group of determined and well-equipped fighters. Every Muslim and Arab took note of that. The Israeli existential doctrine has suddenly collapsed. This may force the Israeli public to make a dramatic shift to the extreme right and may force the army to embark on major reprisals of the Palestinians in an attempt to restore its lost dignity. However, on the long run these cheap victories won’t change the realities of the 6th war. Besides, the Israelis have already resorted to the maximum possible force that is tolerable by the international community still with no success.
Israel last resort now is to rely on its friends in the US and Europe – a position despised by all Israelis. Israel resort now is to rally the West against all Muslims and particularly the Iranians. It is interesting to note that during the fighting in Lebanon, Benjamin Netanyahu was touring world capitals in the West speaking of the need to unite against Islamic terror and Iranian Fascism. Netanyahu made the analogy between Iran and the Nazi and how failure to respond to the Nazi led to the 2nd World War. Bush (after the announcement of the thwarted plot to bomb US-bound planes from London) spoke of the need to confront “Islamic Fascism.” It will be from now on in Israel’s best interest to portrait the battle as a wider one between Islam and the West in the hope that will save the Israeli project. It is hard to project whether Muslims or the West will fall into the Israeli attempt either mindful or not. In many cases, history has its own tortuous paths in which the actors perform certain acts knowing real well they are not in their best interest but they do them because they are left with no good options.
Lebanon because of its very composition will remain most vulnerable to regional conflicts. It is hard to predict a peaceful existence to countries such as Iraq or Lebanon (with multi-ethnic composition extending across the boarder) without the major players coming to terms. For example, in the case of Iraq it is hard to envision peace there without Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kurds, Arabs, and Shiite coming to terms. Unfortunately, when you peel the onion you discover another level of inter-connection. Shiite demands in Iraq lead to Iran, Iran leads to nuclear, nuclear leads to Israel, Israel leads to Palestinians, and Palestinian problem stirs the whole Muslim nation, and so on. The Middle East problems either has to be settled together or not at all: In absence of that, there can be periods of quasi-static calm – one is certainly hoped for since the Lebanese truly deserve it.
Finally, we look at the Arab governments. Governments in Cairo and Riyadh flip-flopped significantly in the course of the conflict. Cairo especially has proven to be shortsighted in its objectives. Cairo initially opted to criticize Hezbollah for kidnapping the two Israeli soldiers and bringing the wrath of Israel on Lebanon. In the meantime even the Lebanese themselves (including Walid Junbulat and Saad Al-Hariri who don’t particularly love Hezbollah) didn’t do so. The Lebanese united position solidified the position of the various Arab governments and gave it character that it was lacking. Lebanon as a whole proved itself to be much more farsighted than its big brothers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is interesting to note that at the height of the crisis and when Arab foreign ministers were mobilized in Beirut, Qatar and Saudi Arabia foreign ministers sparred over the role of their respective countries.
Although Egypt was not spared the Qatari attack, the Egyptians decided not to respond – unlike the Saudis. I am told that Egypt didn’t respond because Qatar gave a lucrative construction deal to one of Gamal Mubarak’s supporters upon the intervention of the Egyptian president himself in a phone call with the Qatari Emir last winter. I can’t verify the authenticity of this story. But no matter what, the crisis once again uncovered the fundamental weaknesses of the Arab regimes and their tendencies to obsess with their own little intra-Arab disputes while ignoring the overall big picture. There is an Egyptian proverb that describes someone who only focuses on the trivialities and make a big deal out of them (Tigi fil Hayfa Wa Titsadar). This best describes the Arab regimes attitude. This was a low point in constant process of decline in the Egyptian status in the region.
If I want to give a final opinion, the 6th war could prove as decisive as the fatal 6th day in Egypt's Cholera epidimic. Some nations would re-emerge and others may be left to whither. Of the 5 main powers in the region, Egypt has proved dysfunctional, Israel is wounded, Iran is re-emerging, Turkey is absent, and Saudi Arabia cannot be diagnosed. The center of gravity in the region solidly now shifted to an arc that extends across the fertile crescent to the Arabian Gulf – oops I meant the Persian Gulf -- or may be as Iranians want to call it: the Islamic Gulf. And the most interesting of all, it is a shift that most Arabs are welcoming.
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